IMAGINATIONS

A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS

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ImagiNATIONS

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This edition of ImagiNATIONs has been a long time in the making, its production disrupted—like so much else—because of the COVID19 pandemic. It is thus my great pleasure to see it finally launched.

ImagiNATIONs is the undergraduate journal of the Canadian Studies program at the University of Toronto. This edition includes fourteen original articles on a wide variety of topics, from a range of disciplinary and interdisciplinary perspectives. They are a fantastic reflection of the quality of work produced by students at the University of Toronto, and their astute engagement with contemporary and historic topics.

Many thanks to Sean Garner, Editor-in-Chief, for all of the work that he put into the journal, as well as to all of the editorial assistants: Carolina Joffre Anez, Adrien Blanchard, Hannah Koschanow, Shauna Mclean and Owen Ward. Congratulations all of you!

It is so very rewarding to have this opportunity to recognize student achievement.

Emily Gilbert
Professor
Director, Canadian Studies Program

Journal Committee 2019-2020

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Preface

ImagiNATIONS functions as the undergraduate journal for the Canadian Studies program at the University of Toronto. The program allows students to explore a myriad of disciplines in relation to the study of Canada. *ImagiNATIONS* reflects this interdisciplinary disposition with the only true requirement being that submissions must relate to the study of Canada. Over its tenure, the journal has consistently reflected a wide array of topics from many disciplines. This volume of the journal features topics ranging from politics, to literature, to history, among others.

During the process of creating this volume of *ImagiNATIONS*, the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has swept across the world, resulting in tragedy on a global scale. The pandemic has presented challenges for many, including those studying at the post-secondary level. Students and faculty have seen dramatic changes in their daily lives and in dealing with the complexities of transitioning to online forms of education. Yet, in the face of a global pandemic, students and faculty successfully faced these challenges head on, including those involved in this project.

The adaptability and continued efforts of the editorial team were absolutely crucial in assembling this volume of *ImagiNATIONS*. Thank you to Carolina Joffre Anez, Adrien Blanchard, Hannah Koschanow, Shauna Mclean, and Owen Ward. This journal commends the many students who bravely submitted their work, whose passion and level of academia was truly incredible to witness. Thanks also to Karel Peters who organized the Canadian Studies Undergraduate Conference for her efforts in promoting both the journal and conference.

A much deserved thank you to Professor Emily Gilbert, the faculty advisor and the glue that holds *ImagiNATIONS* together. Without her continued support, this volume of the journal would not be possible. It is because of her efforts that students are able to contribute their voices and engage in opportunities such as *ImagiNATIONS*.

ImagiNATIONS is also grateful to Professor Emerita and University College alumna Mildred A. Schwartz, University of Illinois-Chicago, for her very generous financial support of this journal.

This volume of *ImagiNATIONS* is a testament to resiliency in the face of unprecedented challenges. Working on this project and alongside the talented individuals involved has been a great privilege and harbinger for the bright future of the academic study of Canada.

Sean Garner
Editor-in-chief

The Fate of the British North Americans
Muhanna Al Lawati

The original 13 colonies posed no perceivable threat to their imperial overlord, the British government. After the notion of taxation without representation erupted from a disenfranchised populace, a sense of national and political unity, followed by a rapidly growing desire for self-governance, had set a precedent in retaliation to the ruthlessness of the British Empire. Following the Revolutionary War, tensions had never particularly settled between the United States and Great Britain, and with the US ever expanding, British North Americans were left in a world that seemed uncertain, unsafe, and in need of defense (Scott, 1942). Yet, external dangers were not the only threats that lingered over British North Americans. Equivalent domestic struggles, such as the political stalemate the Anglo Canadians found themselves in with the French Canadians, further dimmed any hope of a political union. Furthermore, the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 guaranteed an economic boom and helped facilitate a free trade movement. Unfortunately, however, that too was short-lived as the treaty would fall out of favour with the United States and ultimately be repealed. Having been left to fend for themselves in a regional and global theatre, British North Americans looked to solidify their place between the two powers, which, as history has revealed, took shape in the form of Confederation. Consequently, the Canadian Confederation, founded on a need for national unity, economic self-determination, and self-defence, owes a great deal to American influences, primarily stemming from the Civil War, American expansionism, and an exponential rise in economic prosperity.

As British North America (BNA) was attempting to establish its own unique political and national identity, the United States still only perceived it as an extension of the British Empire, which by all intents and purposes, it absolutely was. The Trent Affair of 1861 threatened to directly involve the colonies in the Civil War under imperial obligation on behalf of the British Empire when a Union ship arrested two Confederate envoys from the British merchant ship called *Trent* (Belshaw, 2016). Given Britain's official neutrality status, this was seen as an act of support for the Confederates and, as a result, the British Empire dispatched soldiers to its remaining North American colonies in preparation for an ensuing war. The men arrested were freed and the crisis was averted, but this left British North Americans harboring sympathies for the Confederate cause that they related to somewhat strongly within the context of self-determination of a nation's own policies. Their sympathies for the Confederates were illustrated during the Chesapeake Affair of 1863, when Confederate Maritime supporters captured and diverted a Union steamer from the coast of Cape Cod to Saint John, New Brunswick (Belshaw, 2016). This event not only served to highlight the relatability of the Confederate struggles to those of the BNA colonies, but also further emphasizes the American view of the colonies as an extension of the British Empire, given that the affair was perceived to be an act of war and in direct violation of British neutrality as well as the extradition clause of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty (Belshaw, 2016). A weakened United States was of British interest in this era and therefore indirect British support of the Confederates was favourable from the British point of view. Yet, concerning North Americans, the Chesapeake Affair, ironically enough, could be interpreted as an attempt to not only "confirm their identification with Britain," but also their

"determination to fight for their collective independence in North America," as Donald Creighton accurately states (Creighton 2012: 18). In essence, the United States had stimulated a distinct sense of nationality amongst future British Canadians that was still very much tied to its homeland, the British Empire, while paradoxically inspiring a unique stance on foreign affairs, in this case, involvement in the Civil War.

The formation of the United States had immeasurable consequences pertaining to Canadian Confederation, and the solution of national unity ultimately overcame any challenges or dangers to the autonomy of the people of BNA. Rising tensions, coupled with the result of the Civil War, rendered BNA very vulnerable to the growing Union forces of the United States. Annexationists and expansionist patriots looked to an uninhabited Rupert's Land to incorporate into the American sphere of influence. The reasoning behind American expansionism northwards could most aptly be characterized as anti-British sentiment stemming from the War of 1812, as well as unofficial involvement favouring the Confederate states during the Civil War, particularly surrounding the events of CSS *Alabama*. Not only did the fear of annexation serve as a rationalization for Confederation, but also the division within American federalism itself, culminating in a civil war, stressed the need for a political union more than ever (Scott, 1942). The fears of BNA were both justified and evident in a powerful account provided by Sir Étienne-Paschal Taché, a key figure in Macdonald's coalition government. He strongly defended the need for Confederation during a parliamentary debate, stating that should the opportunity present itself, Canada "would be forced into the American Union by violence."[1] Although unsuccessful in the House of Representatives, the United States proposed the annexation bill of 1866, which ultimately had been the driving force of numerous parliamentary members behind the defense for Confederation. The bill unequivocally removes any doubt for the need of national unity as it outright "establishes new territorial division"[2] within BNA and thus, swiftly united the remaining BNA colonies and moved them closer to the idea of a "common name of Canadian, without the prefix of either French or British," as Thomas McGee, a prominent Father of Confederation, wrote.[3] Yet in the eyes of the Americans, their upwards ventures were found to be of little importance to American interests on account of the nature of the anti-agricultural land (Dickey and Shepardson 1975: 13-14). It is therefore not only argued that this almost immediate reactionary union between two different peoples was founded on what BNAs perceived to be a legitimate external threat to their nationhood, but also perhaps the need in removing any association with their enemy.

The prosperity of a population typically acts as a prerequisite to ensuring the statehood of a particular region, as the state of the economy deeply influences socio-cultural attitudes towards political union. As a result of the unofficial British support of the Confederate states, the BNA colonies found themselves paying the price of their imperialist masters' foolishness, which caused the abrogation of the 1854 Reciprocity Treaty. A period of recession quickly followed for the economies of BNA, as access to American markets was now restricted. James Lemon, an historical geographer, describes the former northeastern British colonies in the US as "capitalist and entrepreneurial" dating back to the 1740s (Lemon, 2002). These former northeastern colonies, following the Civil War, had since witnessed an exponential resurgence of such economic modalities. Consequently, the US economy was now a thriving, industrially based

economy, and access to these markets would serve to alleviate the economic recession experienced in BNA.

Given that the British dictated the international economic policy of its colonies, it can be suggested that in retaliation to an aggravated United States, the Americans withheld access to their markets to further weaken not only the British colony, but also its colonial homeland as the trade link would now be destabilised due to a deflated BNA economy.[4] However, given the rise and popularity of laissez-faire capitalism in Europe in the 19th century, preferred access to British markets was now denied, and thus the BNA colonies looked to the United States as a first step in establishing union through commercial unity in a post-mercantilist world through a united foreign economic policy manifested in Macdonald's National Policy (Belshaw, 2012). In addition, an incentive to emigrate to the US was now apparent as the industrialisation of the States was rapid and filled with opportunity. This era, therefore, saw sizable influxes of British North Americans seeking employment in the burgeoning manufacturing sectors of the United States. Furthermore, this drain in workforce evidently could have encouraged a more autonomous colony through strengthening any notion of a common "Canadian" identity in pursuit of self-determination. Achieving such a feat would perhaps be accomplished through a united commercial policy allowing the rise of a manufacturing sector that would then stimulate "Canadian" employment opportunities to compete with the US, then systematically progress to a more autonomous scale as the nation finds its political union and matures on the world stage.

In conclusion, the Confederation of Canada owes a great deal to American influences, both direct and indirect. The urgency of the foundation of Canadian Confederation was stimulated by events that required a sense of unity amongst the inhabitants of BNA. The Civil War, an arguably unsubstantiated fear of annexation, and the American industrial revolution serve as the most influential prerequisites for the formation of a "Canadian" identity. However, while the institution of a national identity is often conflated with independence, we find that British North Americans found that very sense of identity by strengthening their ties to their British forebears through the achievement of an independent nation and nationality.

Notes

[1] Parliamentary debates on the subject of the Confederation of the British North American provinces: 3rd session, 8th Provincial Parliament of Canada, printed by order of the legislature, Quebec: Hunter, Rose, 1865, p. 6. Sir É.-P. Taché, Premier, Lower Canada, February 3, 1865.
[2] Influence of the American Civil War, Canadian Government: https://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/canadian-confederation/Pages/influence-american-civil-war.aspx.
[3] Letter to his constituents, 1859, quoted in Brady (1925): 52.
[4] "Canada–US Economic Relations." The Canadian Encyclopedia. Accessed November 6, 2019. https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/economic-canadian-american-relations

Toronto's Chinese Canadian Activism in Evolution: The Inner Workings of an Activist Community
Chelsea Colwill

Introduction

Chinese Canadian activist organizations play an important role in the Canadian political and cultural landscape. They are often the first to respond to new government policies, unjust statements made in the media or by officials, and systemic discrimination that affects Chinese Canadians. The importance of such engagement was highlighted by the political participation and representation of Chinese Canadians in the 2015 federal election when voter turnout and representation in Parliament from the Chinese Canadian community were both disappointingly low.[1] Furthermore, ongoing discrimination against Chinese Canadians is evident in the 2010 *Maclean's* magazine article "Too Asian?", the Vancouver housing debate, and wage discrimination.[2] The changing demographics of Chinese Canadians, and the changing nature of racism within Canada, pose serious challenges to those advocating for Chinese Canadians. The importance and impact of ethnic community organizations in Canada has been well documented, but criticism of the organizations still remains. This paper will evaluate academic criticisms of Chinese Canadian activism in light of recent interviews with previous national president of the Chinese Canadian National Council (CCNC) and long-time activist, Amy Go, and with current executive director of the Chinese Canadian National Council Toronto Branch (CCNCTO), Chase Lo. This paper will examine how Chinese Canadian activist groups begin, and how they organize their membership, prioritize issues, develop programming and projects, as well as collaborate with others and reform their organizations. The interviews suggest several important points: that there is a high level of awareness of the dilemmas of attending to the diversity within the Chinese Canadian community; that creative solutions have been developed to support inclusive membership and impactful programming; that Chinese Canadian activists attempt collaborations whenever possible; and that reform is a constant within Chinese Canadian activism.

Collective organization has long been an important part of Chinese Canadian life. Shibao Guo and Yan Guo cite research that notes the historical need, after continual discrimination, for the community to turn inward and the fact that per capita, the Chinese have the largest number of mutual aid associations of any immigrant group in Canada. The history of Chinese Canadian activism, and the inception of the CCNC and the CCNCTO, will be discussed in detail in the paper but it is important to note that the CCNCTO is a branch of the national organization, CCNC. The CCNC, active from the 1980s to the mid-2000s, is currently inactive. The CCNCTO has been active since the 1980s and continues to be very active today.

The academic literature on Chinese Canadian activism in Toronto comes from a wide variety of disciplines and examines it from numerous perspectives. Myer Siemiatycki and Anver Saloojee come from a political science perspective and highlight that the number of ethnic organizations is correlated to formal political participation.[3] Their paper touches on how the organizational process occurs but does not look at the practicalities of operating such organizations. Robert Anderson and Scott Milligan undertook sociological research focusing on

the individual response and benefit of ethnic organizations but, again, not on the workings of the organizations. Shanti Fernando's book, *Race and the City: Chinese Canadian and Chinese American Political Mobilization*, is a comprehensive introduction to how racism presents itself in Canada and how the Chinese Canadian community has mobilized against it. *Race in the City* does not, however, look at how Chinese Canadian organizations decide which groups or individuals to consult, how groups decide to take action on certain issues, or how they work collaboratively. Janet Salaff and Pearl Chan's paper argues that, within the multicultural system, governments must make decisions on which groups to fund, effectively deciding which groups are legitimate representations of their ethnic communities.[4] Salaff and Chan discuss how this leads to competition for government funding, often through appeals to the largest group of Chinese immigrants. However, it does not discuss how organizations consult with the community or how they select specific initiatives to address. Shibao Guo and Yan Guo look at how ethnic organizations within Canada are being used as effective service providers for ethnic communities, but also as a means for the state to "multiculturalize" ethnic groups.[5]

To add to this literature, and specifically to attempt to fill a gap regarding how activist organizations operate on a practical level, I interviewed Amy Go and Chase Lo. Amy Go was national president of the CCNC from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s and a member until its operations wound down. In addition, Amy Go was also part of Chinese Canadian activism in the feminist movement, working in senior care facilities and other areas. Chase Lo, as the current CCNCTO executive director, has a deep understanding of the current state of activism in the city and how decisions within CCNCTO are made. The academic research was lacking in an understanding of the practicalities of Chinese Canadian activist organizations and thus my interviews focused on the practicalities of determining membership, deciding on priorities, creating collaborations, and reforming the organizations. Due to the limited information obtainable through only two interviews, this research may not be conclusive nor speak for Chinese Canadian activism in Toronto as a whole. However, as two of the most engaged activists in Toronto, the interviews with Amy Go and Chase Lo provide valuable perspectives with fascinating answers, and raise new questions worthy of further research.

History of Chinese Canadian Activism in Toronto

Chinese Canadian activism has a long history in Toronto. In her book, *The Chinese in Toronto from 1878*, Arlene Chan writes about the first activist-oriented organizations in Toronto's Chinatown in the late 19th century. She notes the existence of clan and regional organizations but highlights the importance of The Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Society as the first form of activism within the community.[6] Chan describes the society's duties as "maintaining order in the community, defending against external threats, and fighting discrimination."[7] The Benevolent Society of the past was very different from today's activism-focused organizations; due to the disenfranchisement of Chinese Canadians, the Benevolent Society was the only voice Chinese Canadians had in politics and played a much larger role in government relations than today's activist organizations. In addition, the Benevolent Society was composed of merchants as they had the most lobbying power with white society.[8] Post World War 2, major activist movements consisted primarily of small lobby groups travelling to Ottawa to advocate for policy changes; mobilizing, for example, to fight for the abolishment of the Exclusion Act and the cancellation of

demolition to save Chinatown.[9] During this period, personalities defined activism. Leaders like Foon Sien Wong, Dock Yip, and Jean Lumb had significant individual impacts and galvanized the community into action. Chan relays how a new wave of social and political activism picked up in Chinatown in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which aligns more with what we see today.[10]

The history of the CCNC started in the 1970s and grew out of the response to a 1979 CTV W5 program entitled "Campus Giveaway". However, while the W5 program acted as a catalyst for growth, the leadership responsible for the rallying in response to the CTV program had previously been formed through support of Vietnamese boat people. Those who had been involved in facilitating social services for these refugees created strong social and professional networks that allowed for an efficient move to a more formal leadership team.[11] These working professionals then joined student leaders who were agitating over the CTV programming.[12]

After CTV's apology, the leaders came together at a three-day conference on the University of Toronto campus to form the Chinese Canadian National Council for Equity (CCNCE).[13] Anthony Chan argues that soon after its inception, the CCNCE began to focus solely on Ontario and did not support Chinese Canadians in other provinces.[14] He contends that the federal government's financial support of the CCNCE in 1980 represented an "unofficial pact [which] precluded the CCNCE from biting the hand that fed it".[15] However, it is important to note that Anthony Chan's book was written before the crucial work of the head tax redress movement. The CCNC would continue to fight for various issues after the W5 campaign had run its course but the defining post-W5 CCNC projects was the work they undertook on the redress for the Chinese Head Tax. The CCNC collaborated with Chinese Canadian activists across Canada on this issue, created a draft proposal for the federal government, and worked diligently to make head tax redress a campaign issue.[16] Their work was ultimately made moot by the signing of a lesser deal between the federal government and other Chinese Canadian organizations, including the National Congress of Chinese Canadians (NCCC).[17]

Another example of the CCNC's past work is public education projects. In her interview, Amy Go discussed a project she worked on to raise awareness regarding comfort women. This project also included lobbying at the United Nations for reparations from the Japanese government.[18] Lastly, the CCNC has a long history of responding to local government issues, as they did, for example, in 1995, in response to discriminatory comments made by a deputy mayor of Markham regarding the development of Pacific Mall.[19] While the CCNC was involved across a broad spectrum of issues, it was not the sole voice as the CCNCTO was also active during this period. Under Eugene Yao's presidency, for example, the CCNCTO established language classes to support garment workers, and funding was provided to establish a Homeworkers Association.[20]

Membership
Much research notes the importance to immigrants and members of visible minority groups of membership in voluntary associations. While Andersen and Milligan generally focus on voluntary associations and not necessarily ethnic advocacy, they demonstrate how voluntary associations are positive forces for integration in Canada.[21] Similarly, Siemiatycki and Saloojee focus on the impact on immigrants and newcomers of membership in political associations and note how it has a direct impact on their engagement with formal political participation. With the

established fact that membership is important not just to the organization, but also to the individual members, it is pertinent to look at how Chinese Canadian political organizations establish and shape their membership.

This issue came to the forefront in the debate around the Chinese Head Tax Redress Campaign. Two advocacy groups, both focused on the head tax issue, sought outcomes inconsistent with each other: the CCNC fought for individual compensation and an apology while the NCCC was willing to settle with funding for education as the only compensation.[22] Chinese Canadians were split on this issue and many chose to align with certain activist groups through membership.[23] The NCCC had already aligned itself with the needs of recent mainland Chinese immigrants by showing support for the Chinese Communist government.[24] With both sides of the campaign fighting for members, recent immigrants, due to their large numbers, became a battleground for support. As a consequence of the lessor demands of the NCCC, the Paul Martin government chose to negotiate with them and removed the CCNC from the negotiating table.[25] The head tax redress campaign highlighted the divisions within the Chinese Canadian community and the related membership debate that ensued.

Chase Lo and the CCNCTO are very aware of how its membership has developed over the years. First, he highlighted that the CCNCTO is currently undergoing discussions about how to restructure membership to make it more expansive. Change was already in the air, however, as the group's headquarters moved to Scarborough just last year.[26] At the 2016 annual general meeting (AGM), Alvis Choi described this move as a sign of "commitment to connect with newer and growing Chinese Canadian communities in Toronto"[27]. Second, Chase highlighted that anyone can be a member and that the process is quite simple. The membership application, written in both English and Chinese, merely asks for personal contact information and if you are willing to volunteer.[28] Third, Chase relays that the CCNCTO tries to be inclusive of all groups and any failing in that regard is due only to capacity issues. Realizing that it is nearly impossible to fully understand the opinions of all the varying Chinese Canadian groups, the CCNCTO works diligently to build collaborations with other groups such as Butterfly, which works with Asian migrant sex workers, in order to get a better understanding of the issues faced by its diverse community.[29]

Amy Go emphasizes the importance of engaging membership as a means of maintaining an active organization. Similarly, Fernando argues that "one of the main problems for the Chinese Canadian community groups and the Chinese Canadian community in general has been their inability to find issues that bind and focus them".[30] Chase notes that there is a plethora of issues but that engagement really comes down to feeling connected and involved and that having a strong social network is key.

Priorities

Who the members of an organization are does not delimit who they service. Priorities for action are set through a combination of groups including members, the board and executive, and government policies and funding.

AGMs were described by both Amy Go and Chase Lo as the most important place for organizational priority setting. At AGMs, members are able to voice their concerns and vote on resolutions.[31] Amy Go, speaking from her experience in the National Action Campaign for the

Status of Women (NAC), noted that AGMs are extremely long and difficult to chair. AGMs cover a broad range of topics such as budgets, new priorities, and responses to government policies and actions.[32] Amy Go stresses the importance of AGMs to keep organizations active and to ensure that the membership is engaged.

There are numerous other mechanisms for members to share their views on what an organization's priorities should be. Chase Lo described how the CCNCTO used a series of focus groups followed up by an online "needs assessment survey" sent to all members. He said this was a very instructive tool for the organization and that it fostered valuable discussion. Another means is direct contact; Chase notes that people share their concerns by calling, emailing, or discussions at in-person events.

In establishing priorities, organizations may choose to seek ideas from outside of their direct membership. Chase Lo notes the Equity Toronto Committee, formerly known as the Alternative Planning Group, is a key area for him to gauge appropriate priorities. The group is composed of numerous associations, including the African Canadian Social Development Council, Council of Agencies Serving South Asians, and the Hispanic Development Council.[33] In conjunction with these groups, the CCNCTO creates ideas for programming that engage not only the Chinese Canadian community but other immigrant and racialized groups that may face similar difficulties in Canadian society.

Another priority for Chinese Canadian activist organizations is reacting to government policies. When governments release a policy that potentially harms Chinese Canadians in some manner, activist organizations need to take a position and educate the public. Amy Go, noting that this can be a large undertaking, states that it can even take over an AGM agenda. She also emphasizes the need for organizations not to lose sight of other priorities and objectives by only responding to events outside of the organizations' control. Indeed, the CCNCTO has been doing a large amount of reactionary work. For example, it invested a significant amount of time in reacting to the *MacLean's* "Too Asian?" article by rallying and continually pushing for an apology.[34] More recently, the CCNCTO has responded to the deliberations on changing the first-past-the-post electoral system, racism experienced by people on the TTC, road closures, and no trespassing signs targeted at Chinese Canadians in the Township of Algonquin Highlands.[35] The CCNCTO uses many platforms to respond to issues; they have an active Twitter account, Facebook page, and they provide letters they have written in solidarity with other groups, and to governments directly, under their website's Advocacy tab.

Anthony Chan directly criticizes the CCNC, which was the CCNCE at the time, for allowing funding from the government to subdue their activism.[36] With this concern present in much of the literature on ethnic activism, Chan and Salaff note, "As ethnic community institutions become quasi-government structures, culture becomes deeply intertwined with politics"[37]. Chase, however, does not think that this inhibits advocacy. According to him, it is important to differentiate between core advocacy and specific project work. He argues that the CCNCTO will advocate for any issue it deems needs addressing, and funding only affects the projects that the CCNCTO runs. He details, "If [funders] will fund the project then we will do it but the advocacy will always happen". He also notes that funding affects capacity, which in turn can negatively impact their ability to reach out to a broad range of people and service diverse communities. In this way, through funding, governments can control the capacity of Chinese

Canadian organizations but not the issues for which they choose to advocate. Nevertheless, the head tax controversy discussed above provides strong evidence that when competition arises amongst activist organizations, governments have the power to play favourites.

Amy Go highlights a powerful tool that can be used to effectively fight prioritization via government funding: personal ideology. She emphasizes the importance of following one's own ideology. It is also one of the hardest parts of activism, she notes, as everyone wants to make the world, or their community, a better place, but everyone has different ideas on how to get there.

Chase Lo provides another concept for measuring priorities. Under his leadership, the CCNCTO works diligently to support the most vulnerable Chinese Canadians. He cites one of the CCNCTO's most recent projects working to assist Asian migrant sex workers as an example. His philosophy is, "when you address the most marginalized group in our society, you basically liberate everyone else". By addressing these groups, the CCNCTO discovers what the most pressing issues are and gains understanding of the complexities of the community it works in.[38]

Chase Lo is aware that the advocacy work done by the CCNCTO is not always going to be popular, even in his own community. For example, when the CCNCTO came out in solidarity with Black Lives Matter Toronto regarding the police presence during the Toronto Pride Parade, many Chinese Canadians were upset.[39] He acknowledges that it can be challenging to speak against oppressions that some members of the Chinese Canadian community do not recognize, but also notes that it is rare to see a significant amount of direct opposition when they do.

Project Idea Generation
Most ethnic-focused organizations have both programs and projects. Programs are annual or reoccurring community work, often seen in social services organizations, while projects are short term ventures.[40] Due to funding constraints, many activist organizations often focus on project work for which funding is more readily sourced.[41] Due to the reoccurring nature of programs, long-term financial assistance is important but more challenging to achieve. While most activist groups do not take on programs, the CCNC's work on the head tax redress came close to being one. The project spanned decades and required mobilization, public education, lobbying, and inter-group negotiations.[42] Amy Go describes redress as a constant in the Chinese Canadian community stating, "I mean Chinese Canadians always talk about redress".

Project ideas come from a variety of places. At the CCNCTO, the preferred method of developing a new project is when it is presented with an idea that, while fitting within their organization's focus, has already been formed and somewhat fleshed out.[43] At this stage, it is easier for CCNCTO to agree to it, including with certain refinements, and begin sourcing supporting grants.[44] This was the process for the CCNCTO project called Live Well Take Action. Jacklyn Wong, an educator, approached the CCNCTO with ideas for topics that were key to Chinese Canadian youth and wanted to create a space for them.[45] Together, Wong and the CCNCTO formed a project that they thought would be attractive to youth as well as supportive of their needs.[46] At the time, surveys had begun to emerge along with statistical analysis of the high rates of mental health issues among Asian Canadian youth. Both Wong and the CCNCTO thought this was an important issue on which to focus and they subsequently completed a successful grant application.[47] As a consequence of the grant, Wong began working part-time at the CCNCTO.[48]

Another means of project creation is consulting within the organization. Chase Lo discussed consulting with the staff, board, membership, and stakeholders as they are often sources of inspiration for possible projects. Similarly, Amy Go mentions sub-committees as a key source for brainstorming ideas for projects. A further source of project ideas is the wider activist community. Chase Lo believes that other organizations often have a better understanding of niche groups and, thus, ideas on ways to best serve them. Looking at the wider community also allows for opportunities for collaboration. Collaboration will be discussed later in this paper but generally it allows for a pooling of funds to create programs between groups with shared goals. Finally, a source for programming inspiration comes from the changing demographics and their needs. The growing newly immigrated, mostly Mandarin speaking, population ignited the idea of a civic engagement project.[49] This project focused on educating new immigrants on the Canadian political system, the various political parties, and how to vote.[50] Chase Lo mentions that even participants who were not yet citizens were keen on learning and wanted to be engaged. This sort of work matches directly with what Fernando says Chinese Canadian activists should be doing when she writes that Chinese Canadian "community groups" need to play a key role in political mobilization.[51] One of the key personal advantages to being a member of an ethnic organization is the increase in political engagement, and this project brings that advantage to the fore.

Collaboration

Numerous scholars have written that Chinese Canadian activism is too frequently isolationist. Fernando writes that Chinese Canadians should "[form] coalitions of support with other marginalized or racialized groups within the city that share common concerns".[52] Siemiatycki and Saloojee have described Chinese Canadian organizations as isolated and calls upon them to support candidates of other ethnicities.[53] Salaff and Chan state that Chinese Canadian associations are hindered from working with other groups in order to create "a unified powerful, ethnic voice".[54]

Evidence from the CCNCTO's publications, as well as the interviews with Amy Go and Chase Lo, tell a very different story. To start, Amy Go relays how the CCNC tried to collaborate with three different groups with varying success. The most successful case she described was work the CCNC did on the topic of comfort women.[55] The CCNC collaborated with Japanese Canadian women and Korean Canadian women to create a public education project at the Toronto Public Library about Japanese imperialism and the use of comfort women. In addition to public education, the goal of the project was to lobby the Canadian government to put pressure on the Japanese government to provide redress and compensation.[56] This project exemplifies a successful reaching across ethnic lines to collaborate on shared issues.

However, Amy Go provided other examples of collaborations that were less effective. The CCNC attempted to work with artists to represent Chinese Canadian issues but the project fell flat. Amy Go believes it was the individualistic nature of the artists that made the project unsuccessful. Another failed effort at collaboration was with the environmentalist movement. The CCNC made many attempts to create programming with different environmentalist groups but found that none of them were interested. They struggled to find common ground given that the environmentalist movement was very white at the time and had no focus on racism. The

CCNC repeatedly contacted environmental groups in attempts to get them involved. While some responded, many were uninterested. Amy Go describes the attempts at collaborating with the artists and environmentalists as painful and difficult.

The relationship between Chinese Canadian women and the feminist movement was also a trying and difficult one for Amy Go to maneuver. Her relationship with the National Action Campaign for the Status of Women (NAC) began when it invited the CCNC to speak at itst conference on the Meech Lake Accord. Unfortunately, having participated, Amy Go felt that the women who invited her wanted to use her to help label the NAC's Quebec chapter as racist for not supporting the Meech Lake Accord. This event disillusioned Amy Go, who recalls, "I was used basically as their front". Following this encounter, a separate organization was established to fill the gap in the feminist movement: the National Organization of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women (NOIVMWC).[57] While Amy Go found the experiences collaborating with NAC early on painful and embarrassing, the NOIVMWC went on to make a tremendous impact on the feminist movement in Canada. In the 1980s and 1990s, the CCNC made numerous attempts to work with various activist groups, including environmentalists and feminists, but often found that a lack of alignment and sometimes discrimination within these other groups made collaboration untenable.

Chase Lo is very cognizant of the CCNC's history of solidarity and collaboration with other groups and emphasizes the importance of these efforts in all activist work. He states, "the most effective way to challenge oppression is to be standing in solidarity with other communities". This is confirmed by Alvis Choi, Chair of the Board of Directors at CCNCTO who writes,

> "At CCNCTO, we acknowledge the ongoing broader issues of Indigenous rights and sovereignty, as well as anti-Black racism. It is our intention to connect the Chinese community with other marginalized communities in Toronto through efforts of education, advocacy and organizing. It is our hope that such awareness will inform our future work."[58]

Another factor that encourages collaboration is capacity issues. Chase Lo mentions, in regards to servicing a diverse group of people, that the capacity of the CCNCTO often falls short but that, through collaboration, more funding and human resources can be sourced. This purpose provides a counterexample to Salaff and Chan's evidence that government funding produces rivalry between ethnic organizations in Canada.[59]

Solidarity and collaboration are not just catch words to the CCNCTO. To start, as mentioned above, the CCNCTO came out in support of Black Lives Matter (BLM) Toronto's stance on the Toronto Pride Parade. In the letter of support, there is no mention of Chinese Canadian issues and instead, the sole focus is on racism that continues to be perpetrated against Black individuals and a reiteration of BLM's demands.[60] Another example, also previously noted, is the Equity Toronto committee. With this organization, the CCNCTO co-hosted a forum on diversity in Toronto.[61] Chase Lo describes this event as bringing together the communities that make up the diverse demographics of Equity Toronto in order to give them a voice on public policy. The forum focused on four government policies that Equity Toronto felt the government, prior to their implementation, had not engaged about with certain ethnic groups.[62] Events like

this, which showcase cross-ethnic collaboration on anti-racism, either challenge or reveal the outdatedness of Shallaf's, Chan's, and Fernando's criticisms.

Reform

As has been established, the Chinese Canadian community has diverse demographics that are constantly changing. How do Chinese Canadian organizations adapt to service a community whose geographical location, duration of time in Canada, and languages spoken are in constant flux? Both Amy Go and Chase Lo have seen organizations go through periods of reform to adapt to the times and have been heavily involved in the resulting organizational changes.

Amy Go's experiences with organizational reform are extensive and deep. From our interview, two examples are the most poignant. The first is the reforms that occurred in NAC starting in the 1990s as it became more aware of issues facing non-white women.[63] Amy Go marks the election of Judy Rebick in 1990 and Rebick's attendance at a NOIVEMWC meeting as the turning point in NAC. In protest to the white nature of NAC, NOIVEMWC was created to represent issues faced by non-white and refugee women.[64] Rebick showed humility towards, and genuine care for, the specific issues facing racialized women.[65] Amy Go credits her with paving the way for the first racialized president of NAC, Sunera Thobani. This process was incredibly painful though. There was much protest from many of the white women within the organization and, after Thobani's election, Amy Go recalls that Thobani had to constantly prove herself and that donations dropped significantly. The reform story of NAC is one of determination but also bitter-sweet success.

Amy Go also has experience with reform within the CCNC. In her time there, she saw it shift towards being a more feminist organization and one that advocated for the needs of other marginalized groups. Sexism was rampant at the CCNC at the time Amy Go was working there. She describes how women would do all the work but men would go to the meetings in Ottawa and how she was only the second female president. The sexism of the CCNC is confirmed by Anthony Chan, who notes that at the first meeting of the CCNC, the proposal to have a sub-body for Chinese women's issues was treated with dismissiveness.[66] Women within the CCNC rallied for themselves and stood up to men when injustices were perpetrated; actions that allowed for organizational change to occur.[67] Another change she witnessed within the CCNC was the move towards advocating for the LGBTQ community. She notes that soon after she joined CCNC, a provincial debate was occurring as to whether sexual orientation should be included as grounds for discrimination. At first, the CCNC was silent on the issue, believing that it was not something that fell into its domain.[68] Amy Go believed otherwise and brought in Alan Li to help her rally support to change the organization's stance. They were successful in doing so and Alan Li soon after became the first openly gay national president of the CCNC.[69] Amy Go's experience demonstrates that reform in the activist community is often the result of strong personalities.

Chase Lo describes a more constant process of reform. On a general level, he notes that racism has grown more nuanced over the years, which makes it harder to rally people, a point Fernando made about the difficulty of finding a rallying point for the Chinese Canadian community.[70] The CCNCTO has reacted to this change by shifting its activism from a protest movement to one with more public education. This includes educating not only non-Chinese people on the realities of racism but also Chinese Canadians on how they may be facing

discrimination within Canada.[71] Furthermore, each year the CCNCTO has reform meetings to discuss how it should adapt and change.[72] Most recently, meetings of this sort led to the change in location of the head office to Scarborough where more Chinese Canadians are living.[73] However, the CCNCTO is also looking at reform in terms of a three-to-five-year plan. This long-term plan is expected to affect the membership structure, mission goal, and solidarity movements of the CCNCTO.[74] The research shows that reform within Chinese Canadian activism is always purposeful but differs in how it is initiated.

Conclusion

Chinese Canadian activists work with numerous moving parts: the racisms of the country, the changing demographic of the community they serve, and the desire to be an ally to other marginalized groups. The research shows that Chinese Canadian activists and activist organizations think critically about which groups to engage with, how to balance doing what is right versus doing what is popular, how to reform their organizations to best match the needs of the community, and how and with whom to collaborate.

The interviews with Amy Go and Chase Lo point out some strong implications for Chinese Canadian activism research. One is that previous researchers may have been too quick to say that Chinese Canadian activists were not collaborating with other marginalized groups. The interview with Amy Go brought out the important point that establishing collaborations with certain groups may be thwarted by factors outside of the Chinese Canadian group's control. Specifically, she discloses that she found the environmentalist and feminist movements of the 1980s and 1990s discriminatory in their lack of interest in racial issues. With the appreciation that there are many active external collaborations comes the realization that further work is justified to determine if such efforts are being effective. As researchers have noted, fighting against systems of oppression requires cross-ethnical cooperation, and I would recommend that work be done in Toronto to investigate whether this cooperation is as powerful as the researchers suggest it should be.

This project has brought up many unknowns and topics that need further research. First, Amy Go mentioned numerous times that CCNC, the national organization, has become almost inactive. The reasons for this should be investigated and any lessons learned shared with similar organizations. Secondly, both sides of the collaboration story warrant attention and discussion. What is it like for other groups to work with the CCNCTO on issues and how is their solidarity perceived? While this paper examined how Chinese Canadian activist organizations function from an executive perspective, further work is warranted to understand their efforts from the membership's perspectives and the perspectives of those who are serviced by the organizations. Understanding how all these individuals and groups are affected is key to learning about the broad dynamics of Chinese Canadian activism.

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To Parade is to Disrupt: Media Erasure of Blackness in the Toronto Pride Parade and the Reclaiming of Parade as Political Space

Keziah Garber

In July 2016, Black Lives Matter (BLM) Toronto performed a demonstration at the Toronto Pride Parade to bring attention to the absence of queer Black representation at the festival. Two separate newspapers, *The Toronto Star* and the *National Post*, reported on the events and subsequent reactions to BLM's 'disruption' of the Pride Parade, rather than discussing the BLM movement as it relates to the Pride Parade's lack of Black representation. The exclusionary conduct of the parade itself and its organizers' membership committee were also left out of the discussion, and neither article provided a platform for voices of BLM. The articles left out the real discussion BLM intended to ignite, centralized the arguments around an 'othering' of Black people, and contextualized BLM's protest as an interference of normativity, rather than a part of the parade spirit. Both articles reinforce the erasure of Blackness that BLM protested against at the Toronto Pride Parade through their portrayal of the event, and the reactions surrounding it. Furthermore, the media depictions of the protest as a disruption to the parade itself obliterate the political legacy of the parade as both a peaceful demonstration and a site of contestation.

The *Toronto Star* and *National Post* articles portray different views of the social justice group, their demonstration during the recent Pride Parade, and criticisms they received. The *Post*'s article was written as a response to the actions of BLM at the Pride Parade the day before, while the *Star*'s article, published six months after, is a response to the reaction of police officers to BLM's mandate to ban police floats at the Pride Parade. Both articles present different views on the social justice group, yet neither of them is written by or with a member of BLM. The headline of each article provides an important frame for the content. It is also the first, and in some cases only, component readers will notice. The *Star*'s headline is directed at the Toronto police instead of appealing to the Pride Parade organizing committee, which will ultimately decide if it will consider BLM's list of demands. The title calls the police 'confused,' evoking an image of a bumbling, mistaken police, when in fact the police comments against BLM's mandate are just wrong, even racist. The headline plays on the word 'pride' as something the police need to swallow, and in reference to the parade. However, the use of the word 'pride' calls attention to the police having too much pride, when the real issues are the ones raised by BLM, who do not appear anywhere in the headline. Instead, the author of the article is quoted in the headline.

The *National Post* headline underlines the fact that the Pride Parade is bigger in size than BLM, but also that its agenda is larger (or perhaps narrower) and thus overrides that of a seemingly unimportant activist group. The headline characterises the organizer's rejection of the signed document as a binding contract, which alludes to the unevenness of power in the exchange between the two parties. The headline also underscores the word 'conversation;' however, the article itself does not delve into the conversation to be had, and with whom. Again, in this headline as well, voices of BLM are excluded, and instead the voice of an organizer is

quoted. The headline itself manifests exclusion as it is presented from the perspective of a Pride Parade organizer, and neglects to represent BLM.

The two articles distort BLM's purpose, to create a racialized space within this queer space, and representation by othering the bodies of the activist group, in contrast to the purported 'mainstream' perspective. As I will show below, the *Star* article uses othering to portray BLM as an oppressed minority group, without agency or voice, while the *Post* article uses New Racism to depict BLM as radical aliens who terrorize others through social disturbances. Both representations are inherently negative, a trend that the media has maintained, "with the consistent negative portrayal of blacks… [Canadian media] have sustained the discourse of 'otherness'" (Ojo, 345). The employment of othering in the two articles feeds into an inherently racist sentiment that alienates Black queer folks from the discussion.

Although the author of the *Star* piece acknowledges her privilege from the start, she nonetheless writes on behalf of a group that is not presented in the article. The author frames the subjects of the piece through the lens of 'othering,' used to compare Black people against the mainstream, privileged class (Mensah, 20). The author describes Black (queer) people as racially targeted by police and other institutions; thus, in essence, she uses a victim narrative to frame the subjects of the article in contrast to non-Black people. The author quotes multiple police officers, but does not quote any member of BLM. Thus, the author's argument is centralized from a privileged perspective, one that serves as the point of reference in the article (and perhaps the audience), while the standpoint of BLM lies in the periphery, if it is at all existent.

The *Post* article employs New Racism to describe the actions of BLM at the Pride Parade. New Racism is defined by Joseph Mensah as rhetoric that "abandons such explicit racial language in favour of code words" (Mensah, 15). Indeed, the article uses semantics to construct a violent representation of Blackness through the use of the word 'hijack' to describe BLM's disruption of the parade. The word is first used by the author, and then repeated twice more in the article in a quotation by an authority figure to describe BLM's "shameful" protest. The word 'hijack' has been used widely in the mass media to connote terrorist attacks, hence the article equates terrorism with BLM and as such reinforces the stereotype of Blackness as violent. Furthermore, the article establishes BLM as a radical group that is attempting to dictate the course of the parade and ban all floats. The executive director of Pride, Chantelois, is quoted as saying that BLM "is not going to tell us that there is no more floats anymore in the parade." Aside from the grammatical error in the quote, it falsely creates the notion that BLM intends to eliminate all floats from Pride, when in fact the mandate was to ban just police floats. The quote is not contested, nor is it contextualized. Chantelois goes on to state that his "community" and "membership" will ultimately decide if they will uphold BLM's demands. The quote begs the question, Who belongs to his membership and community? While the article's headline suggests that the organizer promised a conversation with BLM, it is clear within the article itself that the conversation is about BLM rather than with them.

The two articles perpetuate the idea that BLM is about disturbance and violence, yet neither conveys any meaningful information about the movement itself. Ojo describes stereotyping as "intrinsic to media…the industry is constructed around simplifying information for audiences to consume by tapping into a collective portfolio of popular and unconscious images…each of which imposes a readily identifiable frame or narrative spin" (Ojo, 347). The

Pride Parade organizers and police reactions to BLM's demands not only pervade the two articles, but they are reinforced by the articles themselves. Both articles focus on responses to BLM's demonstration, yet neither conveys the intentions of BLM. The *Post* article includes quotes from BLM Toronto co-founder Janaya Khan, however the statements are in response to a question about the nature of the protest rather than the platform of the movement. Khan's quote at the end of the article speaks to important issues of "disappearance of space of racialized people and the slashing of budgets," yet neither of these issues is addressed or further elaborated on. Instead, the focus remains on the way that the protest was planned and staged as a disruption to the Pride celebration. The information that is circulated is about the organizers and the police rather than the movement, effectively erasing BLM from the story.

Space plays an important role in both the parade itself and in representations of race. Both of the articles recount BLM's protest as a disruption to the parade rather than as a part of the parade. However, the nature of parades is to disrupt daily routine and challenge the mainstream. Indeed, the very act of parading in the streets disrupts the everyday passage of car and pedestrian traffic, and even forces business closures. Goheen demonstrates that street parades in Toronto (in the 19th century) were characteristically "protest-like" and that they "amplified the significance of the space, updating its symbolic meaning consistent with the nature of social change taking place in the urban society" (Goheen, 142). The celebratory aspect of the parade was only one aspect, while the purpose emanated out of social unrest.

The nature of the parade, at its core, is a political rally for rights not yet gained. The *Post* article claimed that police have "long been involved in Pride," yet the *Star* article contended that the "first Police Service float appeared only in 2014." The Pride Parade actually began as a resistance to police as it arose out of protests against police raids. BLM's demonstration was conveyed as an interruption of the Pride Parade, yet BLM's disruption embodies the very nature of parades whereby "disruptive behaviour associated with certain public processions…[becomes] part of the ritual" (Goheen, 142). BLM's protest can be classified as upholding the ideals of parade, and as BLM founder Khan stated, "returning [parade] to its political roots."

The space of the parade is also a space of contention, a place where dispute and disagreement can be aired. The media portrayal of BLM as separate and in opposition to the Pride Parade fails to account for the way in which parade is "for festive culture and for liminal suspension and inversion of normal social relations" (Goheen, 143). The overturning of everyday norms in parade would include controversial performances such as acts of nudity, which Pride promotes, but also differing and conflicting views. Caribana, another annual Toronto parade, is said to have "no unified intent" but rather "sites of conflict over representation, politicization, and meaning" (Burman, 139). The intrinsic quality of parades is to push against institutional powers, but also to voice multiple and clashing viewpoints that push against each other. Blackness is erased even within a story that alleges to be about Blackness, and instead focus is placed on the 'disruptive' nature of the (Black) protest. The very presence of BLM itself is problematic because it is disruptive. The very existence of BLM and their visibility at Pride demonstrates a temporal occupation of space that has been comfortably designated exclusively for Pride. Not only is the space of the parade off-limits to BLM, they are also left out of the space of the media, and consequently their voices are muted.

The Effect of Young Voter Turnout in the 2011 and 2015 Canadian Federal Elections
Rebecca Hill

Introduction

Every election in Canada marks the chance for new voters to influence government as they enter the electorate when they reach the age of 18. Yet, the turnout of these voters in Canada traditionally has been low. This paper explores the relationship between the turnout of younger voters and the results of the 2011 and 2015 federal elections. In doing so, it is evident that an increase in the turnout of younger voters does not produce the election results expected based on younger voters' voting intentions. Other factors have a greater impact on election results than the turnout of younger voters. These factors include, most prominently, regionalism and the level of urbanization. This will first be demonstrated by reviewing the general political leanings of younger voters and examining the turnout of this demographic in 2011 and 2015. These patterns are then compared with the election results in the 34 ridings with the lowest median age, which act as a representative sample. Last, the discrepancies between actual and expected results are addressed.

This type of analysis was chosen as the ridings with the lowest median ages offer younger voters the greatest chance to affect the election results, as they represent a larger percentage of the electorate when compared to other ridings. There are limitations to this selection, however, as the data includes non-voters, such as non-citizen immigrants and children. Despite this, median riding age offers an indication of the median voter age. In addition, the 34 youngest ridings, according to the 2011 federal census, are the places most likely to observe the results of younger voter turnout. Popular vote is not taken into account or studied in this analysis. Thirty-four ridings were selected as they represent approximately ten percent of the total national ridings. In this paper, the 34 youngest ridings will be referred to as the YR Sample. Table 1 shows the ridings chosen and their median ages.

Table 1: Ridings in the YR Sample by Median Age in Years (from Paperny, 2016)

Riding	Median Age	Riding	Median Age	Riding	Median Age
Nunavut	24.1	Edmonton Manning	34.3	Banff-Airdrie	35.1
Churchill-Keewatinook Aski	26.3	Outremont	34.3	Humber River-Black Creek	35.1

Desnethé-Missinippi-Churchill River	27.3	Peace River-Westlock	34.3	Battlefords-Lloydminster	35.3
Fort McMurray-Cold Lake	31.9	Abitibi-Baie-James-Nunavik-Eeyou	34.4	Calgary Rocky Ridge	35.5
Calgary Skyview	32.1	Milton	34.4	Provencher	35.5
Grande Prairie-Mackenzie	32.2	Red Deer-Lacombe	34.6	Winnipeg North	35.5
Northwest Territories	32.3	Saskatoon-University	34.7	Brampton North	35.6
Brampton East	32.6	Edmonton-Wetaskiwin	34.8	Calgary Centre	35.6
Brampton West	32.7	Saskatoon West	34.8	Laurier--Sainte-Marie	35.6
Spadina-Fort York	33.2	Surrey-Newton	35	Winnipeg Centre	35.6
Edmonton Mill Woods	33.9	Ville-Marie-Le Sud-Ouest-Île-des-Soeurs	35	Bow River	35.7
Calgary Shepard	34				

Voting Intentions

In this paper, younger voters are defined as voters 34 years old or younger. This Canadian demographic is more likely to support leftist and centrist parties, such as the Liberal Party and the New Democratic Party, and much less likely to support right-leaning parties such as the Conservative Party. This is shown in Table 2 and Table 3, which demonstrate EKOS survey data from both 2011 and 2015.

Table 2: EKOS Survey Data for the 2011 Federal Election (EKOS 2011a, b, c, d, e)

Party	Poll Results for Under-25-Year-Old Voters						Mean of General Population
	April 6th	April 13	April 18	April 26	May 1st	Mean	
CPC	19.5%	17.7%	25.5%	20.9%	25.9%	21.9%	35.2%
LPC	42.2%	25.8%	24.6%	20.2%	19.0%	26.4%	25.3%
NDP	9.9%	21.1%	29.9%	28.3%	37.2%	25.3%	22.9%

Table 3: EKOS Survey Data for the 2015 Federal Election (EKOS 2015a, b, c, d, e)

Party	Poll Results for Under-35-Year-Old Voters						Mean of General Population
	September 24	October 2	October 6	October 13	October 18	Mean	
CPC	32.7%	25.2%	26.0%	7.1%	23.6%	22.9%	28.8%
LPC	29.4%	25.4%	27.9%	17.4%	35.4%	27.1%	27.6%
NDP	21.5%	29.3%	29.3%	24.6%	24.1%	25.76%	22.9%

The data in these polls are limited due to changes in how EKOS defined age cohorts from 2011 to 2015, but it offers a general indication of the voting intentions of under-34-year-old voters. Additionally, the polls have a mean margin of error of 2.32 percent 19 times out of 20 for 2011 and 2.26 percent 19 times out of 20 for 2015.

Table 2 shows that, in the month prior to the 2011 election, voters under 25 were approximately equally likely to support the Liberal Party as the New Democratic Party. They supported the Liberal Party at about the same rate as the general population, but were more likely to support the New Democratic Party based on the same comparison. They were also far less likely to support the Conservative Party than the other two parties, and over 10 percent less likely to support the Conservative Party when compared to the general population. This demonstrates that the younger electorate leaned towards more leftist and centrist parties in 2011.

The same trend can be observed in the 2015 election, as shown in Table 3. Again, the New Democratic Party enjoyed more support from voters under 34 than in the general population, with the opposite trend for the Conservative Party. The Liberal Party also had the support of younger voters at about the same rate as the general population. Moreover, in the 2015 poll conducted on October 18, 79.9 percent of under-35 voters said another Conservative majority government would be "…very disturbing…" (EKOS 2015e). Based on this, younger voters in both elections supported more leftist and centrist parties. Therefore, as the turnout of younger voters increases, it would be expected that, in the YR Sample, the New Democratic Party would be most likely to win ridings, followed by the Liberal and Conservative Parties. The opposite trend should be observed for elections with lower younger voter turnout.

Turnout and Expected Results
The turnout rates of younger voters in the 2011 and 2015 federal elections are examined. In 2011, only 55 percent of voters aged 18 to 24 and only 59 percent of voters aged 25 to 34 actually voted (Sharanjit and LaRochelle-Cote, 2016). This is compared to a 70 percent voter turnout rate for the general population (Sharanjit and LaRochelle-Cote, 2016). As a result of this low turnout in the 2011 election, it would be expected that Conservative Party candidates would have an increased chance of winning ridings in the YR Sample. This is because younger voters, who have been shown to lean away from the Conservative Party, were not participating in the election. In 2015, 18-to-24-year-olds voted at a 67 percent rate and 25-to-34-year-olds voted at a 70 percent rate (Sharanjit and LaRochelle-Cote, 2016). This represents a 12 percent and an 11 percent increase in voter turnout for the two groups (Sharanjit and LaRochelle-Cote, 2016). It is also closer to the turnout rate for the general population, which in 2015 was 77 percent (Sharanjit and LaRochelle-Cote, 2016). Therefore, in the 2015 election, New Democratic Party and Liberal Party candidates were more likely to win ridings with more younger voters than Conservative Party candidates. This is due to a higher participation of voters who are more likely to support the New Democratic Party and Liberal Party, and less likely to support the Conservative Party.

Election Results
The election results in both the 2011 and 2015 federal elections do not mirror the expected results based on the turnout of younger voters. The election results in the ridings of the YR Sample, organized based on province, are outlined in Figure 1 and Figure 2 (Paperny, 2016).

Figure 1: 2011 Election Results by Province

Figure 2: 2015 Election Results by Province

2015 Election Results in the Ridings with the Lowest Median Age by Province

In 2011, the Conservative Party won the majority (62 percent) of ridings in the YR Sample and 41 percent of the same ridings in 2015, which was a plurality and tied with the Liberal Party. This makes it seem that the increase in turnout of younger voters in 2015 had an impact on election results. The Conservative Party (which younger voters are less likely to support) lost a large number of ridings in the YR Sample, which was previously won in 2011. When compared to the overall election results, however, the Conservative Party has more enduring support in these younger ridings. In 2015 the Conservative Party had a 41 percent decrease in the number of ridings it held from 2011. However, the party had a 33 percent decrease from 2011 to 2015 in the YR Sample (CBC, 2015). This reflects that the Conservative Party actually did better in the ridings with more younger voters than in the overall 2015 election. In contrast, as predicted by polls, the New Democratic Party also performed better in 2015 when younger voter turnout was high. In 2015, the New Democratic Party lost 40 percent of the younger ridings it had won in 2011, but overall lost 57 percent of itsridings from 2011 to 2015 (CBC, 2015; Paperny, 2016). The Liberal Party, expected to perform well in the younger ridings as in the general election, performed much worse. The party gained 467 percent more ridings in the YR Sample from 2011 to 2015, but also gained 541 percent more ridings overall (CBC, 2015; Paperny, 2016).

Examining the Discrepancies
The discrepancies between the expected election results in the YR Sample and the actual election results can be attributed to many factors. However, regionalism and the level of urbanization are two of the most significant. Out of the ridings in the YR Sample, 38 percent are in Alberta, compared to nine percent of the total national ridings (CBC, 2015; Paperny, 2016). Voters in Alberta in both 2011 and 2015 voted overwhelmingly in support of the Conservative Party (CBC, 2015). On the other hand, Ontario and Quebec, where most of the national ridings are

situated and the Conservative Party was less supported in 2011 and 2015, are only represented by ten of the ridings in the YR Sample (CBC, 2015; Paperny, 2016). Therefore, the increase in turnout of largely leftist younger voters in 2015 was not able to counteract the regional voting patterns in Alberta, where a plurality of the ridings in the YR Sample are situated. Therefore, regionalism mitigated the effect of the increase in younger voter turnout in 2015 in terms of ridings won.

In terms of the level of urbanization, Statistics Canada considers 15 of the 34 ridings in the sample as rural ridings, with a population density less than 400 inhabitants per square kilometre (Statistics Canada, 2015, 2019). This can be seen in Table 4 (next page).

Table 4: Population Density in YR Sample Ridings (Inhabitants per Kilometre Squared) (Statistics Canada, 2019)

Riding	Population Density	Riding	Population Density	Riding	Population Density
Northwest Territories	0.0	Banff-Airdrie	11.0	Calgary Centre	2,422.4
Nunavut	0.0	Red Deer-Lacombe	20.7	Winnipeg North	2,567.8
Abitibi-Baie-James-Nunavik-Eeyou	0.1	Edmonton-Wetaskiwin	32.8	Winnipeg Centre	3,021.0
Churchill-Keewatinook Aski	0.2	Milton	255.5	Humber River-Black Creek	3,535.5
Desnethé-Missinippi-Churchill River	0.2	Edmonton Manning	767.4	Brampton North	3,568.9
Fort McMurray-Cold Lake	0.8	Calgary Shepard	816.4	Surrey-Newton	3,815.4
Peace River-Westlock	1.0	Saskatoon West	915.8	Ville-Marie-Le Sud-Ouest-Île-des-Soeurs	5,151.0
Grande Prairie-Mackenzie	1.0	Calgary Skyview	1,107.4	Outremont	8,542.0
Battlefords-Lloydminster	2.5	Brampton East	1,437.0	Spadina-Fort York	9,266.1
Bow River	4.8	Brampton West	2,244.4	Laurier-Sainte-Marie	10,756.9
Provencher	5.5	Edmonton Mill Woods	2,305.9		

One hundred and seventy-four federal ridings have a population density of 400 inhabitants per square kilometre or less (Statistics Canada, 2019). In the YR Sample, 41 percent of the ridings are considered rural, versus 51 percent nationally (Statistics Canada, 2019). However, there is a much larger proportion of ridings with a density of one person or less per square kilometre within the YR Sample than in the total federal ridings. This paper refers to them as "extremely rural". There are eight ridings (28 percent of the sample) that are extremely rural. Nationally, there are 17 ridings within the same range, which represents five percent (Statistics Canada, 2019). Therefore, approximately the same proportion of ridings in the sample and nationally are considered rural. However, the YR Sample is more extremely rural. This is important as rural areas are more likely to elect the Conservative Party (McGrane et al., 2017, 20). In both 2011 and 2015, the Conservative Party won 50 percent of the YR Sample extremely rural ridings, which demonstrates this more enduring support (Paperny, 2016). In addition, the Liberal Party won zero percent of the ridings in 2011 and only 25 percent in 2015 (Paperny, 2016). This further supports the notion that even younger extremely rural ridings are more likely to elect the Conservative Party. However, the New Democratic Party won the other 50 percent of these ridings in 2011, compared to 30 percent for all ridings nationally (Paperny, 2016; CBC, 2015). In 2015, the New Democratic Party won 25 percent of the youngest extremely rural ridings, when they won only 13 percent of the national ridings (Paperny, 2016; CBC, 2015). This is interesting as it suggests that the New Democratic Party also has enduring support in younger extremely rural ridings, but this support is less significant than Conservative Party support. Overall, the level of urbanization, or the large proportion of rural and extremely rural ridings within the YR Sample, contributed to the sample ridings being more likely to elect the Conservative Party. As discussed earlier, the Conservative Party was expected to be the least likely party to win in the YR Sample, which shows that an increase in younger voter turnout in 2015 was not enough to overturn the voting patterns of rural areas.

Conclusions
To conclude, younger voter turnout in Canadian federal elections increased substantially in 2015 from 2011. Additionally, younger voters are more likely to vote for leftist parties such as the New Democratic Party and less likely to vote for right-leaning parties such as the Conservative Party. They are also equally likely to vote for the Liberal Party as the general population. Despite this, in the YR Sample, the Conservative Party enjoyed a more significant amount of support than in the overall election. This was due, at least in part, to regionalism and the voting patterns of rural areas. It also demonstrates that, in the ridings where younger voters had the greatest potential to affect the election results, other factors other than age proved a more significant influence to the election outcomes. As elections in Canada are decided based on ridings won, this calls into question whether younger voter turnout actually has an effect on federal election results. The results of this paper also suggest that further study in this area would be helpful to better understand Canadian federal election results.

The Case Against Private Sector Involvement in Canada's Health Care System
Lorina Hoxha

Public healthcare has long been one of the most significant markers of Canadian national identity (Dufresne et al., 2014, 570), but a growing concern with reducing deficits and meeting the demands of changing demographics, technology, and medical practices has fueled a privatization movement that has led governments on all levels to reconsider their commitment to a comprehensive application of the principle of universality. Unsurprisingly, what has followed is a highly contentious and value-laden debate (Cukier et al., 2005, 94). Proponents of privatization emphasize that private sector involvement would lead to greater efficiency and higher quality of health care services, while proponents of public care are concerned with issues of equity and accessibility (Cukier et al., 2005, 97).

This essay will argue that greater private sector involvement has a negative impact on the quality of health services because the market and the health care system have fundamentally different priorities. When health care is framed as a commodity rather than a right, profitmaking incentives will often take precedence over quality of care. As was echoed by Bayle et al., "the marketplace has no interest in looking after the health problems of citizens, but rather only in assuring the profitability of its investments" (Bayle et al., 2001, 145). While this accusation may be seen as extreme, it nonetheless highlights a disjunction of interests that has too frequently resulted in some of the complications arising with privatization. This essay seeks to examine some of these complications: understaffing in hospitals, the contracting out of jobs in health care services, the overprovision of health care for some in addition to underprovision for others, longer wait times, as well as harmful drug patents, among other issues, all of which have produced legitimate concerns about accessibility. Issues of accessibility are particularly important to highlight given the situation the Canadian system currently finds itself in: due in large part to an aging population, the fastest growing components of health care are drug therapy and homecare, neither of which are covered under the Canada Health Act's definition of insured services (Epps et al., 2002, 753). Through an overview of the current state of Canada's health care system, an examination of where it stands in comparison to the United States, and a case study of a privatization effort in Vancouver, this essay will attempt to debunk the mythologies of efficiency and cost-effectiveness that are often used in support of privatization.

Canada's health care system is founded on the idea of equal distribution of quality health services regardless of the ability to pay (Epps et al., 2002, 751). This national standard was primarily set with the passing of the Canada Health Act (CHA) in 1984, which ensured coverage for "medically necessary" hospital services (S.2) and "medically required" physician services (S.2), in addition to outlining five essential criteria that provincial systems must fulfill in order to receive federal funding for their services: public administration, comprehensiveness, universality, portability, and accessibility (S.8-12). While, ostensibly, Canada's system is single payer and public, in practice, 30 percent is privately paid for (Blomqyist et al., 2015, 3), very few hospital and physician services are delivered by public entities (Epps et al., 2002, 754), and, in order to cut costs, provincial governments have de-insured many health services that were previously

understood as "medically necessary" by deciding they should no longer be categorized as such and thus disqualified from public funding (Epps et al., 2002, 756). As Epps et al. note, "the CHA's protection of hospital and physician services, however, no longer reflects the reality of the range of goods and services that are viewed as medically important…[and] large portions of health care now lie outside the protection of the CHA" (753). This is especially true for drug therapy and homecare, the two fastest growing components of health care (Epps et al., 2002, 753), for which patients must pay for through private financing. The implications of this in regards to accessibility, especially when one considers the large and ever-growing older demographic in Canada, are troubling. Lack of coverage easily leads to the emergence of an extremely inequitable two-tier system in which the rich are capable of buying out necessary care and others fall through the cracks. In BC's residential facilities, the number of corporate controlled beds increased by 599 percent between 1990 and 2004, and 2529 beds were cut between 2001 and 2004 (Cohen et al., 2005, Table 8). As Armstrong et al. point out, by constricting access to nursing homes and lengthening waiting lists, governments are pushing people towards alternatives like homecare, which are even more privatized (Armstrong et al., 2015, 103). A 1999 poll found that the average personal expenses for homecare were $405 a week (Picard, 1999), a number that has likely only grown since.

Similarly, inequities in access to drug therapy are growing increasingly grim. In his article, Ostry traces the Canadian government's obligations in regards to patent law under the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the US and states "[the Canadian government] moved to expand patent protection for brand name drug companies at the expense of Canadian generic drug companies that had been supplying the Canadian market with low-cost generic drugs" (Ostry, 2001, 5). Increased patent protection will protect private drug companies from competition and reduce the availability of cheaper drugs (Ostry, 2001, 5) while reducing the capacity of provincial governments to control the costs of these drugs (Ostry, 2001, 6). Yet this series of policy decisions does not even seem to make financial sense. Prescription drug costs rose 77.4 percent between 1996 and 2006 (Canadian Institute for Health Information, 2007), mostly as a result of replacing existing and cheaper drugs with newer and more expensive ones, which, in most cases, had no added benefit (Canadian Health Coalition 2007, 7). These drugs accounted for 80 percent of the increased expenditure on drugs in BC (Morgan et al., 2005, 815). Hiked up prices have predictably had a damaging impact on accessibility: a major study found that 3.4 million Canadians were uninsured or underinsured for drug costs (Fraser Group et al., 2000, 28). People who are unable to afford their prescription drugs are thus at risk of further deteriorating health, which may subsequently lead them to the hospital, putting a greater strain on public insurance. With both patients and doctors feeling the increasing influence of pharmaceutical companies, the Canadian Health Coalition notes that "drug costs are skyrocketing but health outcomes are not necessarily improving" (CHC, 2007, 7). These huge gaps in coverage are in large part the reason why Canada's healthcare system is increasingly being described as "in crisis" (Barnett et al., 2000).

Support for public health care is often hard to argue against when one compares the coverage granted by Canada's system to that of the United States. Although private sector involvement has led to an imbalance in areas of insurance coverage in Canada, the situation is not yet as dire as it is in the United States, where 48.6 million are uninsured (DeNavas-Walt et

al., 2012, 21). In their report of a national random-sample survey of bankruptcy filers in the United States, Himmelstein et al. found that, for 68.8 percent of bankrupt recent homeowners, the causes of their bankruptcy were medical (743): "41.8% of interviewees specifically identified a health problem, 54.9% cited medical or drug costs, and 37.8% blamed income loss due to illness" (Himmelstein et al., 2009, 743). Their study goes on to reveal that hospital bills were the largest out-of-pocket expense for 48 percent of patients, and prescription drugs came second at 18.6 percent (744), although they were by far the largest expense for patients with pulmonary, cardiac, or psychiatric illnesses (744). Unsurprisingly, the misfortune is only exacerbated when, for 37.9 percent of patients, someone in their family lost or quit a job for medical reasons (744). Yet, despite this severe lack of a government safety net, the US government still has more than three times the healthcare costs per capita than Canada (Woolhandler et al., 2003, Table 1). This is in part due to the higher cost of private for-profit hospitals, which, as Professor Devereaux notes, "have to generate 10-15 per cent profits to satisfy shareholders. Not-for-profit facilities can spend that money on patient care" (CUPE, 2013). Devereaux here echoes a fundamental problem: the government will not work to its potential by offloading the responsibilities it has to its people to the market, because the people are not the market's priority.

One of most visible effects of privatization is the proliferation of private clinics. While private clinics are thought to reduce wait times at public clinics, what ends up happening is quite the reverse: health workers and specialists migrate to the private system, and in turn deplete the resources of the public system, causing longer wait times, with an MRI often taking several months (CMAJ, 2011, 2). In addition, private clinics have been reported to be overcharging and providing too much health care. This is one aspect of privatization that backfires on the rich. In a recent study of patients undergoing colonoscopy in hospital and non-hospital settings, it was found that 31.7 percent of patients were charged for what was a medically necessary treatment protected by the CHA, and many were instructed to do more follow-up testing than is recommended (Ivers et al., 2010, 80). Canadian Doctors for Medicare reports that private clinics are charging three times as much, and offer unnecessary tests that pose their own risks (CMAJ, 2011, 2). As Martin and Dhalla note in their article "Privatizing healthcare is risky for all of us," in the US, people with private health insurance often receive unwanted, invasive procedures that carry risks of serious complications, as well as screening tests and CT scans that emit harmful radiation (Martin, 2012). In short, privatization leads to too little health care for some and too much for others, thus not only posing ethical problems but resulting in a harmful impact on both groups.

Finally, one of the more disastrous effects of health care privatization is the proliferation of precarious work. In 2003, during George Campbell's early years in office as Premier of British Columbia, a piece of provincial government legislation was passed that contracted out and privatized all hospital-based support work in Vancouver to three multinational corporations. The rationale behind this legislation was, unsurprisingly, cost reduction: contracting out jobs was deemed necessary for managing growing health costs and meeting health objectives (Zuberi et al., 2011, 907). Yet, as was also noted by Stinson et al. in a 2005 study, most financial savings came directly from reduced labour costs, which disproportionately affected the most vulnerable employees in the health care system, many of whom were living under the poverty line (Zuberi et al., 2011, 907). In their report based on the Hospital Support Workers Study, Zuberi and

Ptashnick point out how severely understudied hospital support staff are given their critical role in the provision of quality medical care: "they clean and sterilize post-operative surgical rooms, prevent antibiotic-resistant bacterial infections among hospital patients, and dispose used needles and toxic waste. They prepare meals for diabetic patients, people with severe allergies, and those who have difficulty chewing food" (907). Their article notes that the workers reported that contracting out resulted in the deterioration of workplace conditions, specifically through understaffing, workplace injuries, high turnover, and a lack of training (908). Naturally, this forces workers to rush cleaning procedures, which heightens the risk of spreading infections. Zuberi et al. emphasize the importance of maintaining surplus capacity in hospital support staff in case of a higher influx of patients, arguing "problems arise when the just-in-time model of labor provision, critical to maximizing profits earned by private contractors, collides with the reality of uneven and unpredictable shifts in demand" (909). Unfortunately, with the exception of a situation scandalous enough to provoke a large legal battle, there is little incentive for private contractors to compromise profit maximization, and little capacity on the part of the provincial government to make them do so.

There are some limits to the argument put forth in this essay. While Canada's health care system is undoubtedly better functioning than that of the US, and privatization has led to some major consequences, it would perhaps be premature to rule out all possible benefits without looking closer at European public-private partnerships, especially in countries such as Switzerland, the UK, and the Netherlands. In its report, the C.D. Howe Institute characterizes Canada's health care system as "narrow but deep" because of its complete coverage for only certain areas of healthcare, and argues that it would benefit from having a more balanced system through retaining private sector involvement (Blomqvist et al., 2015, 3). The better European health care systems all guarantee basic and essential coverage, but allow for voluntary supplementary private insurance. Canada is just as, if not more, privately financed as these systems, but its privatization is too heavily concentrated in areas like outpatient drugs and homecare. While this essay argues that health care should remain in the domain of the public sector exclusively, understanding the feasibility of this given the obligations Canada has to various FTAs would require more research. European systems provide an important perspective on whether compromising an entirely socialized system for continued private sector involvement, albeit with progressive health care reform through the introduction of comprehensive pharmacare and homecare programs, is indeed more feasible. Whether such a compromise could ever ensure or sustain equitable access is doubtful, but worthy of further investigation.

This essay has examined the problematic complications that arise from privatization in an effort to showcase the reasons why health care equity is incompatible with the commodification of health. I argue that these complications are all rooted in the misguided attempt to reconcile two sectors that have fundamentally different priorities: one for profit, and one for people. What naturally follows is that the miseries of the current state of health care today should be dealt with through more comprehensive public funding rather than privatization. Health care is either a right or it is not. To uphold it as one while simultaneously allowing private actors to create obstacles to accessibility and reap benefits from patient sickness is contradictory at best, and destructive at worst.

The Golden Spruce: Natural Resource Management in Canada
Griffin Kelly

Canadian natural resource usage is a paradox; it attempts to simultaneously conserve land so as to preserve the myth of the country's "natural" identity, while extensively exploiting raw materials to support the economy. This process is facilitated by the dichotomy of "ancient" versus "modern" practices. Canada's Indigenous peoples are considered to be "ancient;" their traditional lifestyle and practices are seen to be from another time, which makes their concerns irrelevant in the 21st century economy. "Modern" practices are seen to be industrial and benefit the capitalist economy; they utilize natural resources as economic goods. Thus, the discourse of "ancient" versus "modern" informs the exploitation of Canadian resources, as well as the settler-colonial treatment of Indigenous peoples, both through industrial resource extraction and the modern environmental movement.

This is demonstrated by the Canadian logging industry. Timber represents a major source of jobs, raw goods, and income for Canada, most noticeably in the province of British Colombia. This will be explored through an examination of logging practices in Clayoquot Sound, a notable site of Indigenous activism, and the book *The Golden Spruce: A True Story of Myth, Madness, and Greed* by John Vaillant. *The Golden Spruce* is the story of Kiid k'yaas, a Sitka Spruce with a genetic mutation that caused it to be gold coloured. The tree was located on Haida Gwaii, an archipelago on the northwest coast of Canada, and became an element of Haida spirituality. In 1997, it was cut down by logger Grant Hadwin to protest the destructive British Colombian forestry industry.

The exploitation of the Canadian natural environment is facilitated by the separation of humans from wilderness through the discourse of "new" and "ancient." Theorist William Cronon argues that wilderness has been described and interpreted through the lens of the wild as the "sublime" or as the "frontier." This has created a myth that the wilderness is separate from humankind. Wilderness is "sublime;" a place to witness God and his creations. This notion was absorbed and propagated by Romanticism and its notable writers, such as William Wordsworth, Henry David Thoreau, and John Muir, in their descriptions of sites such as Yellowstone, Yosemite, and the Grand Canyon (Cronon 73-75). As a place of God, these areas are seen as beyond the human realm, and humans can therefore abdicate their responsibility for the land.

This process is continued through the myth of the frontier. Cronon argues that the frontier is the origin story of America, but it is also applicable to the Canadian pioneer and colonialist experience. In the United States, the process of cultivating a plot of land is framed as the quintessential American experience. The colonization and extraction of resources from Canada for Britain is a similar process, as seen through the celebrated stories of the beaver pelt trade, the legacy of the Hudson's Bay Company, and the Canadian Pacific Railroad. As industrialization developed, Americans feared that their "roots" and identity would be lost. In the late 1890s, Frederick Jackson Turner declared that the "frontier has gone," and with it, the first chapter of American history (Cronon, 76). There began the process of visiting nature in order to "shed the trappings" of an "overly refined and civilized modern world" and reconnect with one's roots

(Cronon, 76). The ancient way of living, of American "primitivism," was essential to reclaim through temporary interaction with the wild. This fuelled the American national parks movement and the conservation of land for recreation spaces (Cronon, 77). This distinction of the land as a place that is completely "nonhuman," that must be sought out and visited, built a distinct barrier between the wilderness and humans. This dualism leaves no place for humankind within nature. Therefore, humans' extreme extraction and exploitation practices of natural resources are acceptable.

This process also separates the colonizers of Canada and the US from Indigenous peoples. The myth of the landscape as "virgin" and "wild" was constructed through the forced removal of Indigenous populations across both territories (Cronon, 79). The Indigenous relationship to land is different from their colonizers, as it does not separate the human from nonhuman in the same manner. Jamie Yard argues that nature is an external object onto which humans project and construct systems of meaning to create power relations. Cronon's "myth" of wilderness has dictated European settlers' separation from wilderness. In this interaction, the nonhuman is prevented from negotiating its relationship, and is spoken for by those who can "translate." The power of "translation" is held by a network of scientists, environmentalists, and industry professionals who can derive a "purified, stable set of meanings" (Yard, 88). These translations can make a viewpoint about the purpose of a nonhuman object seem like "a given object or naturalized fact," which causes that meaning to be prioritized over other interpretations (Yard, 89). In addition, this can force Indigenous groups "to fit into existing scientific-legal discourses employed by processes of the State" to have their voice heard (Todd, 221). The "modern" purpose of raw goods is continually prioritized over Indigenous viewpoints of the wild. For example, Umeek of Ahousaht, of the Nuu-chah-nulth Nation of Vancouver Island, states that "Nuu-chah-nulth were encouraged to see other species, as well as other peoples, as equals" (200). This viewpoint is excluded from Canadian environmental or economic policy: it is subordinated behind an elevated view of nature as "other" and an object for economic gains.

The logging industry is an example of the process of Canadian industrialization of wilderness spaces. *The Golden Spruce* describes the evolution of initial European contact on the Canadian west coast with the Haida people into a complex system of trade, first based on otter skins, and then on the extraction of timber from the Pacific Northwest. When settlers arrived in North America, nature conservation was already popular in Europe, but colonizers desired to turn the "new world" into something "productive" (Vaillant, 93). This exemplifies the separation of self from responsibility to land, for although conservation was becoming a "necessity" in industrialized Europe, it was incomprehensible for the new world. From this point forward, BC would be the epicentre of logging; today, the province is the greatest exporter of softwood lumber in the world (*Trade and Invest BC*).

This status has been contested in Clayoquot Sound, on the west coast of Vancouver Island. This is the region of the Nuu-chah-nulth Indigenous peoples, who have stridently opposed the development of their land by logging companies, such as the major firm MacMillan Bloedel. In 1988, Meares Island in Clayoquot Sound was threatened by clear cut logging by MacMillan (Gilbert "Resource Extraction"). The Nuu-chah-nulth peoples and environmental activists protested this clearing and were awarded a court injunction to halt the process (Gilbert, "Resource Extraction"). A task force was opened by the provincial BC government to investigate

the land dispute, but in 1993, it came back with a plan that divided Clayoquot Sound into 3 areas: logging, conservations, multiuse. Sixty-two percent of this land was used for logging (Gilbert, "Resource Extraction"). Umeek states that this disrespect and violation of land claims is part of the process of equating the civilized way of life with technology, the technology of forestry. He states that civility entails "honesty, virtue, humility, kindness, responsibility," in opposition to Indigenous ways of knowing, which prioritize environmental conservation (204). This "civilization has been brought to the 'wilderness' with destructive force" (205). This idea is exemplified in an excerpt from *The Golden Spruce* in which a logger describes the satisfaction he derives from his job: "It's a challenge to walk into a mess like this and get it looking civilized" (Vaillant, 219).

Cedar Man, Joe David, 1984
David is an Indigenous artist and activist who originates from the Tla-o-qui-aht Nation, a subset of the Nuu-chah-nult peoples. This carving is on display at the University of British Columbia Museum of Anthropology, and was raised in front of the British Columbia Parliament Buildings in Victoria in the 1984 Meares Island anti-logging protest. (Photos: Griffin Kelly, UBC, February 19, 2017).

The degradation of the Canadian natural landscape is inherently exploitative, and engages in the problematic discourse of "ancient" and "modern." However, the modern environmental movement also engages in a similar discourse, which supresses the rights of Indigenous groups. In the 1980s and 1990s, "… environmental rhetoric became increasingly wedded to a discourse of indigeneity" (Braun, 80). Braun refers to this new movement as "postcolonial environmentalism" in which Indigenous peoples are equated with nature, and the processes of "saving" nature became equivalent to "saving" Indigenous cultures. This is highly problematic, as this results in the logic that "transforming nature is seen as equivalent to destroying Native cultures" and discounts their right to self-determination (Braun, 80). The "arrival of modernity" is structured as the "death knell of indigeneity" (Braun, 104).

This is due in part to the "spectacularization of nature," in which specific aspects of nature are highly elevated for their intrinsic value, such as the Golden Spruce (Braun, 78). Hadwin was attempting to demonstrate the irony of "set asides," small plots of land conserved by

MacMillan, including the Golden Spruce, in the face of massive deforestation (Vaillant, 118). Hadwin was unaware of the spiritual and cultural significance of the Golden Spruce to the Haida people, but claimed to be close with Indigenous peoples. Yard states that Hadwin stands as an example of a "… typical raced and classed sense of entitlement to represent otherness," in that he assumed that to simply side with Indigenous peoples was to stand against modernity and industrialism, but did not take into account their alternative system of values associated with the forest (97). Yard refers to this as the "collapse of native identity into nature" (100), wherein Indigenous peoples are "relegate[ed] to prehistory" (Braun, 86).

The "modern-premodern" divide in the environmental movement results in the same consequences of industrialization. It delegitimizes Indigenous concerns and offers the "… untenable choice between being subsumed as a part of nature or acculturating to the lifeways of the moderns" (Yard, 99). A press release from the Council of the Haida Nation stated that the "loss of K'iid K'iyaas is a deliberate violation of our cultural history" (Vaillant, 136). A community member compared the felling to the events of 9/11 (Vaillant, 136). The catastrophic effects of this act demonstrate that it is necessary to acknowledge and give credence to Indigenous relationships to "other-than-humans … as concrete sites of political and legal exchanges" in the current day context (Todd, 222).

Throughout Canadian history, the discourse of "ancient" versus "modern" has been utilized to justify the extraction of Canadian resources at unsustainable rates, notably in the forestry industry. In addition, the settler-colonial treatment of Indigenous peoples and the modern environmental movement use the rhetoric of "modern" and "pre-modern" to subordinate the rights of Indigenous peoples. Hadwin's act was successful in that it drew attention to the "… acquired habit of treating the forest as a universal abstract object for economic manipulation" (Yard, 92). However, Hadwin's lack of consideration for the alternative value system of the Haida Nation is an example of the colonial mistreatment of Indigenous peoples through the subversion of Indigenous values for the elevation of settlers' goals. The government approvals of the Kinder Morgan Trans Mountain pipeline and Enbridge Line 3 expansion, in direct opposition of the wishes of Indigenous peoples and environmental activists, demonstrates a continuation of the Canadian tradition of exploitation of natural resources.

*The Enduring Politics of Colonialism in the Negotiation of
Comprehensive Land Claim Agreements*
Hannah Koschanow

Introduction

The long and complicated history between the governments of Canada and First Nations
communities can be traced back to the 16th century and the arrival of the first settlers: the French
and the British.[1] European settlers were quick to establish Indigenous peoples as subordinate,
exposing them to various forms of violence. The First Nations were vulnerable to foreign disease
and were forcibly uprooted from their homes to accommodate the new settlers.[2] One of the major
injustices that still impacts Canadian society today is the issue of land claims disputes. Upon
their arrival, Europeans dubbed Canadian land as "terra nullius": a legal principle that considers
discovered lands as 'empty' (Keith, 2015: 61). By not acknowledging the First Nations as
inhabitants of the land, the settlers began a long history of dehumanization and disregard of
Indigenous peoples and their rights.

Today, the issues surrounding land claim agreements are expansive and complex. This
paper investigates comprehensive land claims between First Nations communities and the
Canadian government, documenting the various ways that the Canadian government falls short
of upholding their mandate of reconciliation in their negotiations. This paper argues that the
Government of Canada fails to negotiate comprehensive land claim agreements in good faith due
to their colonialist mindset that fails to honour the best interest of Indigenous communities. This
will be explained by providing an overview of comprehensive land claims, and exposing the
tactic of dispossession and the hegemonic power dynamics that the Canadian government uses
during said negotiations.

What are Comprehensive Land Claims? To understand the implications of land claim treaties,
it is important to understand their history and content. Keith Crowe describes the land claim
negotiations "as part of the treaty process [to] provide jurisdiction and resolve ambiguity over the
ownership of use of land and resources" (Crowe, 2019). Historically, the Royal Proclamation of
1763 and the numbered treaties signed between 1871 and 1922 included provisions regarding the
possession of land. It should be noted that, in the case of the numbered treaties, "many
descendants of the Indigenous signatories claim that their title to the land was never ceded;
rather, the intent was to share the land and its resources with the federal government" (Crowe,
2019). This shows that, from the beginning of their relationship, the interests of the Canadian
government did not recognize those of the Indigenous population. Today, land claims under
negotiation are separated into two main types: 1) specific land claims, which "are based on
problems arising from the administration of treaties, the Indian Act, and First Nations funds and
the disposition of land; and 2) comprehensive land claims (CLCs) that "are based on the
traditional use and occupancy of land by Indigenous peoples who did not sign treaties, and were
not displaced from their lands by war or other means" (Crowe, 2019). As of 2016, there are
approximately 100 CLC negotiations happening across Canada that not only shape the country,

but also establish new working relationships between the government and First Nations communities (Crowe, 2019).

Dispossession Disguised as Reconciliation
While supposedly committed to reconciliation, the Canadian government has done very little to reaffirm its relationship with Indigenous communities. In reality, treaties are used as an opportunity for the government to limit Indigenous rights and seek economic growth. An essential inclusion to CLCs is the "certainty" clause, whereby the government must clarify that the First Nation will not open up negotiations in the future. "This is accomplished by the Aboriginal party agreeing to 'cede, release and surrender' their pre-existing Aboriginal rights and Aboriginal Title, or, under the 'certainty' clauses, conceding to never assert these rights and titles" (Samson, 2016: 93). Indigenous communities are able to own their land, but only if they surrender their titles to the Canadian government, thereby diminishing their constitutional power and ability to demand their rights. Additionally, the Canadian government uses these negotiations as an opportunity to gain rights for economic development. Colin Samson reflects this viewpoint by stating that, "according to the Mohawk political commentator Russel Diabo and the Idle No More movement, the Harper government intended land claims to be the vehicle to resuscitate the termination of collective rights to land in order to enable resource extraction projects on what will become fee simple lands" (Samson, 2016: 94). This directive is not unique to the Harper government. In the 2014 interim document on CLCs, it is stated that the directive of negotiations is to promote "reconciliation" as "a means of obtaining a secure climate for economic and resource development that can benefit all Canadians" (Samson, 2016: 98). The focus is not on creating an environment conducive to the wants and needs of First Nations, but fitting the process of reconciliation in the box of dominant Western values. In her article "The Totalizing Nature of the Canadian State: Modern-Treaties in the Age of Reconciliation," Jennifer Keith cites the government document *Renewing the Comprehensive Claims Policy: Towards a Framework for Addressing Section 35 Aboriginal Rights*. The document is a starting point for discussions surrounding land claim issues, with a purpose to "clarify the land and resource rights of Aboriginal claimants, government and the private sector, through the negotiation of settlement agreement and to promote a secure climate for economic and resource development that can benefit all Canadians and balances Aboriginal rights with broader society interests" (Keith, 2015: 51). This excerpt, as well as the other documents mentioned, puts the economic and resource development of Canada above the wants and needs of Indigenous communities. Land is very important to the First Nations, not only in terms of the land they live on, but also because it is connected to their culture and way of life. This framework for addressing land claims promotes a message of assimilation under the disguise of reconciliation. The government will sit down to negotiate only as long as the process fits into the box of Western ideals. If the intention is to approach the issue of land claims through a lens of authentic reconciliation, the Canadian government should take effective action to meet the needs of Indigenous communities.

Land Claims and the Hegemonic Power of the Canadian Government The problem with the process of land claim negotiations lies in the enduring power dynamics of colonialism. Jennifer Keith's article addresses the Canadian government's exercise of hegemonic power over

Indigenous populations through the framework of land claim treaties. The treaties present "an exercise of consensual domination," twisting the direction of the treaties to favour the government's mandate (Keith, 2015: 52). She asserts, citing Peter Kulchyski, that the state's objective is to "find a mechanism to incorporate [First Nations communities] into the dominant order and the political form in which the powers of self-government are deployed reflects the values of the dominant western logic and furthermore embodies, enacts, and perpetuates those cultural values" (Keith, 2015: 48). As previously mentioned, the goal of the Canadian government in entering these treaties is not to understand the wants and needs of the First Nations, but rather to further resource development and economic gain. Crowe suggests that the "rights granted to Aboriginal peoples are part of colonialism and not a remedy for its effects, since such 'rights' are invariably created, controlled, and limited by Canada itself" (Crowe, 2019). Furthermore, Keith states that "until there is a genuine questioning of Canada's illegitimate ownership and occupation of Indigenous lands, no policy, agreement or well-meaning bureaucrat will create a just relationship between Canada and the Indigenous peoples" (Keith, 2015: 62). It is useful to consider CLCs without the complicated language and political framing that the government applies: as an exercise of their enduring colonial power over Indigenous populations.

Conclusion

The negotiations of CLCs are important processes that shape our country. While CLCs have the potential to promote the Canadian government's mandate of reconciliation, in reality they are used to assert dominance over Indigenous populations. The government exercises colonial powers by dangling Indigenous ownership of land above their heads in exchange for the surrender of their constitutional Indigenous rights. As Keith accurately articulates, "achieving true reconciliation will require a change in Canadians' and Canada's policy, not a change for Indigenous peoples" (Keith, 2015: 62). Until the government changes its approach in negotiating CLCs, true reconciliation will never be possible, and colonialist ideologies will endure.

Notes

[1] "Early History." The Canada Guide. Accessed December 18, 2019. https://thecanadaguide.com/history/early-history/
[2] Ibid.

No More Stolen Sisters: The Genocide of Indigenous Women, Girls, and Two-Spirit People
Annie MacKillican

On September 1, 2016, the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls was launched under promises made by the Trudeau government in the 2015 election as a means to respond to the calls to action made in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada. The government initiative would also respond to the overwhelming demand for an investigation into the 1180 murders or disappearances of Indigenous women, girls, and two-spirit folks between 1980 and 2012. On June 3, 2019, three years later, the National Inquiry released its final report. The Final Report of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls outlined the truth-gathering process of the inquiry, described the findings of the inquiry that had been gathered from nearly 2400 participants over three years, and made 213 calls to justice, or recommendations. These recommendations were aimed at governments, media, service providers, police services, educators, social workers, and more (National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, 2019).

In this paper, I will examine the ways in which the Final Report of the National Inquiry reveals truths about colonialism and colonial violence through its truth-gathering method and trauma-informed process. I will also demonstrate the disproportionate effect that colonial violence has had on Indigenous women, girls, and two-spirit folks through the denial of culture, language, and tradition. Finally, I will examine Call to Justice 2.3, which pertains to culture and language revitalization, and how the call works toward decolonization and reconciliation in Canada.

In Reclaiming Power and Place: Executive Summary of the Final Report, the National Inquiry opens the executive summary by naming the phenomenon in which Indigenous women, girls, and two-spirit folks are disproportionately murdered and kidnapped as genocide, which was not done in the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, 2019). The report identifies that, while all Indigenous people are targeted by the genocide that is being carried out by the Canadian state, Indigenous women, girls, and 2SLGBTQQIA people are particularly and disproportionately targeted (National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, 2019).

The National Inquiry was able to come to this conclusion through their extensive truth-gathering process in which the Inquiry heard testimony from nearly 2400 family members, survivors, artists, expert witnesses, and traditional knowledge keepers. The National Inquiry was tasked to report on systemic forms of violence committed against Indigenous women, girls, and two-spirit folks, but more specifically, to examine the underlying factors that contribute to the perpetuation of this violence. The first chapter of the Executive Summary, titled "Centering Relationships to End Violence," identifies four distinct pathways that maintain and uphold colonial violence in Canada. The first pathway is the prevalence of historical, multigenerational, and intergenerational trauma. The second is the social and economic marginalization of Indigenous women, girls, and two-spirit people. Third is the maintenance of the status-quo and

institutional lack of will regarding the child welfare system. Last, the authors identify the ways that the agency and expertise of Indigenous women and gender-diverse people are ignored (National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, 2019).

Chapter 1, in conjunction with the next three chapters, sets up the context for understanding how colonization takes place in Canada and how it specifically affects women and girls. The National Inquiry in Chapter 5, "Confronting Oppression—Right to Culture," outlines how colonialism and colonial violence seek to undermine cultural rights and eliminate Indigenous culture as a whole (National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, 2019). Loss of culture, within communities and individuals, is experienced as a form of trauma, which extends intergenerationally and is not easily healed. With cultural elimination through the Indian Act and colonial policies, the traditional role of women, girls, and two-spirit people is diminished and faces the risk of being forgotten (National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, 2019). In this sense, colonial violence affects Indigenous women and gender-diverse people in a disproportionate and specific way.

In Chapter 4 of the Executive Summary, titled "Colonization as Gendered Oppression," the report describes the history of gendered colonization in Canada from the time of contact when terra nullius and the Doctrine of Discovery challenged not only the leadership structures existing in communities and leadership positions held by women and gender-diverse people, but also Indigenous notions of gender in general. As seen in Chapter 2 of the Executive Summary, "Indigenous Recognition of Power and Place," communities had established unique roles to be held by women and two-spirit or gender-diverse people, including roles as first teachers, mothers of nations, or matriarchs. These roles were further challenged when the Indian Act tied the Indian status of women to that of their husbands meaning that, if an Indigenous woman were to marry a non-Indigenous man, she would effectively lose her status and thus access to her community, family, and culture (National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, 2019).

Métis and Inuit women also experienced similar types of gendered oppression that set up the cultural contexts for them to be disproportionately targeted by colonial violence. Métis women, who had distinct relationships with French fur traders, had varying experiences in residential schools as they were either singled out and mistreated for being Métis or they managed to evade residential school, but were thus denied any form of schooling altogether (National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, 2019). Inuit women were often removed from their communities to give birth, thus removing themselves and their child from the cultural resources available to them at home. Oftentimes, these women were also forced to undergo sterilization or to relocate to centralized settlements far from their communities. These gendered forms of colonization and violence against Indigenous women have been centuries in the making, and created the conditions for the crisis of missing and murdered Indigenous women and girls (National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, 2019).

Audra Simpson, in her article titled "Captivating Eunice: Membership, Colonialism, and Gendered Citizenships of Grief," describes how the Indian Act and other colonial policies effectively facilitated the disappearance of Indigenous women through status (Simpson, 2009). By revoking a woman's Indian status, Simpson argues, a woman's right to her culture, land,

community, and family are also eliminated. For many years, Indian status ran exclusively through the father's lineage, meaning that Indigenous women and girls were excluded from their right to community and culture. As Simpson explains, these women simply disappeared. With their disenfranchisement, they lost the right to live with their communities, and therefore were lost to colonialism (Simpson, 2009).

The difficult challenge about this, however, as Simpson argues, is that for many Indigenous communities, specifically Haudenosaunee and Mohawk communities (with which Simpson is most familiar), women are responsible for the transmission of culture. With fewer women in the communities and fewer people who grew up being taught the traditional ways of life from women, the right to culture was lost.

To this day, many Indigenous communities struggle to reclaim their culture due to the number of women who were disenfranchised and thus excluded from their traditional roles as teachers for generations. Two-spirit and gender-diverse Indigenous people have also had similar experiences with their loss of culture and traditional roles for a number of reasons. First, when Europeans arrived at Turtle Island, Western ideals of gender were imposed upon many communities, two-spirit folks were forced to conform to be either male or female, and often lost the ability to perform their traditional roles as people who existed between or beyond the European gender binary (National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, 2019). Even today, however, many two-spirit folks struggle to reclaim their culture due to the erasure they face in the Queer Studies academic community, which often disregards the relationship two-spirit people have with the land and with the colonial structures of government (Driskill, 2010).

In Qwo-Li Driskill's "Doubleweaving Two-Spirit Critiques: Building Alliances between Native and Queer Studies," Driskill argues that the classification of Indigenous two-spirit people as simply queer people of colour disregards the specific notions of gender that vary between nations. Additionally, Driskill believes this classification disregards the history of colonial violence experienced by two-spirit people at the hands of the state, which is unique from other queer people of colour (Driskill, 2010). Driskill describes a concept called rhetorical sovereignty, the notion that people have an inherent right to determine their own language for identity. Often, queer studies revoke this sovereignty by expressing sameness between queer people of colour and two-spirit Indigenous people, thus disrespecting the agency of Indigenous gender-diverse people and also hindering their ability to reclaim their traditional roles.

The National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls Final Report makes 213 calls to justice that provide recommendations to a variety of bodies in order to rectify the conditions that make Indigenous women, girls, and two-spirit people susceptible to violence. I find one call in particular to be relevant to the report's focus on loss of culture, and that is Call to Justice 2.3:

"We call upon all governments to ensure that all Indigenous women, girls, and 2SLGBTQQIA people are provided with safe, no-barrier, permanent, and meaningful access to their cultures and languages in order to restore, reclaim, and revitalize their cultures and identities. These are rights held by all segments of Indigenous communities, from young children to Elders. The programs and services that provide such access should not be tied exclusively to government-run cultural or educational institutions. All governments must further ensure that the

rights of Indigenous children to retain and be educated in their Indigenous language are upheld and protected. All governments must ensure access to immersion programs for children from preschool into post-secondary education." (National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, 2019) This call to justice outlines how all levels of government must work towards the provision of barrier-free access to culture for Indigenous women, girls, and 2SLGBTQQIA people in a variety of means, including educational programs and immersive language programs.

The first segment of Call to Justice 2.3 states that the right to meaningful access to culture is one held by all Indigenous people, from young children to Elders. This means that governments must ensure that all members of the community who wish to participate in programming have the right to do so. The call to justice also states that children must retain the right to be educated in their own languages, which includes having access to immersion programs from preschool all the way to post-secondary education. Language is largely considered to be the vessel in which culture is transmitted. Hence, many teachings and elements of Indigenous cultures are difficult to teach in English or French; thus, one must know the language in order to know the culture (McKay, 2018). Many Indigenous languages (at least in the Great Lakes area) are largely verb based as opposed to English, which is noun based. Each word in language carries a teaching or a story as to how the word came to be, which offers a deeper understanding of the culture. Through language education, one gains the ability to learn about one's own culture, as one has gained the foundation required to understand it fully (McKay, 2018).

One aspect of Call to Justice 2.3 that I find the most compelling is the sentence "The programs and services that provide such access should not be tied exclusively to government-run cultural or educational institutions." This, in my opinion, serves an important role in the moving towards decolonization. The National Inquiry is calling on the government to return a sense of agency to Indigenous communities, to their women, girls, and gender-diverse people. This is a practice commonly used with survivors of violence, specifically sexual violence, as agency is returned to the survivor as the violence committed against them is largely tied with abuse of power. It's important to return the power to the person from whom it was initially taken. When thinking about decolonization, returning control of cultural programming to the Indigenous communities that will benefit from it is a form of power changing hands; the group that suffered intense colonial violence for generations now has the power to control its own reclamation of culture. This is distinctly different from a form of revitalization that continues to be controlled by the oppressor.

To conclude, this paper has examined how the Executive Summary from the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls reveals truths about colonization through the identification of the four structures that maintain colonial violence, as well as through the undermining of cultural rights as a means to oppress and eliminate Indigenous culture from society altogether. We have then looked at how these colonial policies disproportionately affect Indigenous women, girls, and two-spirit people through both historical accounts of gendered colonialism via the Indian Act and modern Queer Studies disciplines that often exclude two-spirit peoples' connection to land as well as their unique roles within their communities. Finally, we have examined the Final Report's Call to Justice 2.3 as it pertains to

language and culture revitalization, and how the act of returning control of cultural programming to the communities themselves can contribute to decolonization.

On a personal note, I became interested in the field of Indigenous politics in the fall of 2015, when the new government announced the start of a National Inquiry into the 1180 Indigenous women, girls, and two-spirit folks who had been murdered or gone missing between 1980 and 2012. At 17 years old, I felt compelled to learn as much as possible about these 1180 people who had suffered at the hands of the colonial state. However, as the Final Report makes very clear, it is impossible to know exactly how many lives have been lost to this genocide, as is the case with all genocides. Ultimately, as was the case with the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, this inquiry does not have all the answers, nor can it offer the solution. All it can do is point to a path of healing; a path that all members of society must choose to walk together.

The Origins of the Reform Party and its Lasting Effects on Conservatism in Canada
Nick Mahoney

Many of Canada's current political idiosyncrasies can have their roots traced to the early 1990s. This was a time of significant change in Canadian politics. The 1993 election marked a particularly monumental change in electoral competition. The emergence of the Bloc Québécois and Reform parties, along with the demise of the Progressive Conservatives (PCs), displayed the magnitude of this shift. The Reform Party began as a movement party centred around the alienation of Western Canada, eventually creating a right-wing populist movement strong enough to dismantle the Progressive Conservatives and leave a lasting imprint on conservatism in Canada.

Western alienation is once again becoming a prevalent issue in Canadian politics. Despite its contemporary significance, the issue is nothing new. In fact, it was the main factor leading to the creation of the Reform Party. McMenemy (1976, 35) states that a movement party is a party that expresses attitudes that organically form within society. The origins of the Reform Party show precisely this path to creation. The birth of the Reform Party was at a 1987 conference held in Winnipeg with the maxim "The West Wants In!" (Archer and Ellis, 1994, 277). This sentiment was the West's reaction to the policies of successive governments, including even those of the Progressive Conservative Party with prominent Western cabinet ministers, which Westerners felt alienated by. The final straw was the PC Mulroney government's decision to award a lucrative contract "to a Quebec company, when a Manitoba company had submitted a lower bid and had greater expertise" (Dobbin, 1991, 74). As Wiseman describes, "the Reform Party … represented not the misbegotten offspring of the electoral system but the real, palpable political clash of competing cultural visions and regional identities" (2007, 114). This left a large contingent of Westerners searching for a way to represent themselves in Ottawa. The result was the Reform Party, whose members believed that in Canadian federal politics, "the federal cabinet, Quebeckers and central Canadians are the big winners, followed by organized groups and Charter Canadians, all of whom exercise power over, and at the expense of, Westerners and average voters" (Archer and Ellis, 1994, 293). It is therefore very clear that the matter that galvanized Reform Party members was the perceived slighting of Western Canada by the rest of the country. These feelings were the foundation of what would become a very powerful organization in Canadian politics.

While the Reform Party began as a textbook example of a movement party centred around the feeling of Western alienation, it left its mark on conservatism as a whole in Canada and is remembered for more than being a vehicle for Western sentiments. To understand this shift, along with the populist structure and strategies of the Reform Party, one must look to Reform's founder, Preston Manning. Preston is the son of Ernest Manning who, as the leader of Alberta's Social Credit Party, served as Premier of Alberta from 1943 to 1969 (Sharpe and Braid, 1992, 2). The elder Manning was a prominent figure in Canadian politics, one of the main figures in Western politics for many decades, and eventually served as a senator. Ernest was "revered almost as a saint by many, he dominated Alberta political life in the years he was in power"

(Dobbin, 1991, 1). Preston inherited many traits from his father, including his Evangelical convictions, much of his political ideology, and the devotion with which he worked towards his goal of attempting to reshape Canadian politics and society (Sharpe and Braid, 1992, 4). The Mannings were stalwarts not only of Alberta politics but of conservative thought in Canada. The pair was long inundated with the idea of promoting "the cause of the new social conservative philosophy and the idea of political realignment" (Dobbin, 1991, 38). Following Ernest Manning's retirement from politics, he founded M and M Systems Research Limited, where he and his son created works such as "Requests for Proposals and Social Contracts," which is described as "a statement of how social conservatism would actually work" (Dobbin, 1991, 46). In fact, both Ernest and Preston were so fundamentally driven by their own philosophy that they were seemingly out of touch with the world around them. They did not "respond to any reading of what the Canadian public was actually thinking or wanted in the way of government policies. Preoccupied with ideology … the only way to achieve power was to meet secretly and plan to move at just the right moment - when the conditions were exactly right" (Dobbin, 1991, 66).

Even while outside of the political limelight, Preston was set on propelling his vision through a party of his own. As Dobbin (1991, 65) describes, "while the goal of a reformed conservative party seemed to be on the back burner publicly, the conditions for such a party were constantly being tested." Manning's own words provide an explanation for the timing and populist structure of the Reform Party. In his book *The New Canada*, Manning explains, "I wanted to be involved in a genuine populist movement rather than a traditional political party. I also decided that, rather getting in on the tail end of the populist movements produced on the Canadian Prairies during the Depression, I would wait for the next one" (1992, 7).

The next opportunity for a sweeping populist movement in the West came during the aforementioned period when feelings of Western alienation were high. Preston took advantage. Manning's home province, Alberta, happened to be a nearly perfect place to start his populist movement. Wiseman's 2011 writings on the political culture of Alberta describe a region largely shaped by its considerable population of American immigrants, and note that, like American populism, Alberta's version of populism rejects socialism and focuses on the ideals of a free market (46). Like his fellow Albertans, "Manning's free-market ideology was not rooted in any expressed community sentiment or shared vision: it was inspired by an imagined threat of a left-wing conspiracy" (Dobbin, 1991, 66).

When the stars aligned and the timing was right, Manning set out and "deliberately cast the Reform Party as a neo-populist revival, imitating such Western predecessors as the Progressive Party, the United Farmers, and Social Credit" (Flanagan, 2013, 80). Flanagan's chapter in *Conservatism in Canada* lists a number of ways in which the Reform Party was a populist party. These include, among others, prioritizing formal membership, the use of referenda within the party to make decisions, a flat party structure, and a dependence on grassroots fundraising (Flanagan, 2013, 80-82). This party structure and the concordance of the movement with the political circumstances in Western Canada propelled the Reform Party to become a "substantial third party" in the late 1980s and 1990s (Carson, 2014, 1).

The success of the Reform Party set off a chain reaction that led to a number of changes in the 1990s. First, it became clear that Reform was no longer a regional movement party. The popularity realized during and following the 1988 federal election led to a Reform Party

referendum on whether to expand and become a national party. Ninety-two percent of respondents voted in favour of expansion (Manning, 1992, 293). The 1993 federal election brought with it one of the biggest shifts in electoral fortunes that the country had ever seen. The Reform Party jumped from one seat to 52, capturing nearly 19 percent of the vote. Similarly, the Bloc Québécois emerged, winning 54 of Québec's 75 seats to become the official opposition (University of British Columbia, 1997). Meanwhile, the Progressive Conservatives, which had been the governing party, fell from 156 seats to only two, despite capturing over 16 percent of the national vote, largely thanks to the success of Reform in taking away the PC base (University of British Columbia, 1997).

While the increased success was good news to Reformers, the resultant vote splitting with the Progressive Conservatives meant the Liberal Party won consecutive majority governments with ease. Manning knew that vote splitting would prevent Reform from a realistic chance at becoming the governing party and thus attempted to unite conservatives in Canada by disbanding the Reform Party and starting the Canadian Alliance (CA) (Patten, 2013, 69). The rebranding backfired for both the cause of uniting voters on the right and Manning in particular. When the Canadian Alliance chose its first leader, Manning attempted to appeal to more Progressive Conservatives and Liberal or Red Tory voters by presenting a milder image, while "Stockwell Day returned to the populist rhetoric of its [Reform's] past and won" (Marwah et al., 2013, 106). Under Day's leadership, the vote splitting continued and despite winning a few seats in Ontario, the party failed to manifest its envisioned expansion east of the Prairies (Carson, 2014, 33). This is once again consistent with McMenemy's writings, as regarding populist parties he argued that "Because of a leadership oriented to regional values and customs, the populist party is not likely to become a major national force and is vulnerable to dissolution upon the retirement of the leader" (1976, 38). The failure of the CA to expand into central Canada made a merger with the PCs inevitable, given it was the only path for conservatives to reclaim the ability to form a government.

While it may certainly be posited that the effects of the Reform Party are still being felt, it is often difficult to tangibly discern these effects without in-depth knowledge of conservatism or individuals in the Conservative Party. However, one can clearly see a lasting imprint by looking at the legacy of Stephen Harper. Following the merger of the Canadian Alliance and the Progressive Conservatives, the former Reformer was selected as the first leader of the Conservative Party of Canada (CPC). Harper initially made waves at the first Reform Party convention in Winnipeg. In *The New Canada*, Manning recounts the tale: "The best speech and most influential presentation at the Founding Assembly of the Reform Party of Canada – and there were numerous strong presentations – was that given by Stephen Harper" (1992, 149). This depiction of the young Harper continues almost prophetically: "Harper's delivery was eloquent and understandable to those not well versed in economics, marking him as a potential spokesman, candidate, and member of Parliament."

Harper is one of the most frequently mentioned figures in Manning's book, which speaks to his stature within the party. As one of the country's longest-serving prime ministers, there is no doubt that the man who was once a fixture of the Reform Party has left his mark on the nation. Furthermore, as an iron-fisted ruler of the Conservative Party, it is even more certain that Harper has taken part in shaping Canadian conservatism. James Farney and David Rayside echo this

insight in their appropriately titled book *Conservatism in Canada*. When writing about the beginning of the Conservative Party of Canada, they state that the party showed "policy dominance effected by those who came from the Reform/Alliance side. The selection of Stephen Harper as leader signalled a neo-liberal free market emphasis as radical as in any major party in recent Canadian history" (Farney and Rayside, 2013, 12). This is an explicit statement of the continuity of Reform policy into the early days of the Conservative Party, but what is equally interesting is the subtext that would cause one to draw comparisons between Harper and Manning himself. While much of Preston Manning's ideology came from the ideals of social conservatism or from his evangelical upbringing, the neoliberal principle of free enterprise was his, and thus his party's, "guiding principle for public policy and general prosperity" (Dobbin, 1991, 61). This is one of many parallels that Harper and Manning demonstrate. Harper's confidante and former campaign manager Tom Flanagan tellingly relates that "Stephen Harper's political development was moulded in the crucible of Preston Manning's populism" (2013, 79). In simple terms, Canada's most dominating political figure in the 21st century learned much of his craft from Preston Manning, son of Ernest, godson of William Aberhart, founder of the Reform Party. If this is not the mark of a lasting imprint, then it is hard to find one.

  To this day, the initial grievances expressed by Westerners within the Reform Party persist. The party, which receives the support of the Prairies, is very clearly the CPC, perhaps in part as a result of the legacy of the Reform Party. This is just one of many continuities between the entities on the right of Canada's political spectrum, but one that Nelson Wiseman felt important enough to mention in his article on conservatism in Canada. He notes, "the base of the new Conservative Party, like its predecessor party and Reform/Alliance, continues to be the West and English Canada's rural/small town districts" (2008, 65).

  Preston Manning, a student of Western populism and a right-wing evangelist, founded his own right-wing Western populist movement when the moment was right. With this, he was able to create a national party that dismantled a PC party that had governed for nearly a decade by stealing a huge share of its base. The remainder of the Reform movement constituted more than half of the membership of the CPC in its beginning and contributed to the Conservative Party's most successful figure, a student of Preston Manning, who himself governed for nearly a decade. At present, Manning remains a prominent figure in Western politics, currently sitting on "a new panel that will study what the province should demand as a 'fair deal for Alberta'" (Dawson, 2019). It appears there may yet be more Reform to come.

Effects of the Canada Child Benefit
Sohrab Naderi

In the 2015 election, Justin Trudeau's Liberal Party won a majority of seats in the Canadian House of Commons while running on a positive centre-of-left platform that advocated heavily for the middle class. One of the mainstays of the Liberal policy platform, and now one of the Trudeau government's most talked-about achievements, was the Canada Child Benefit and the replacement of the Harper-era Universal Child Care Benefit and other associated benefit payments. I seek to analyse the implications of this transition, the effectiveness of this program, and what exactly brought about this initiative. I argue that the Trudeau government's Canada Child Benefit reflects the Liberals' preference for selectivity and, indeed, provides greater protection against unmet needs for families in the middle class and below. This policy was largely shaped by the Liberal Party's attempt at a progressive platform whilst sticking to popular cash transfers.

The Canada Child Benefit (CCB), as defined by the Canada Revenue Agency (2019, 6), is a "non-taxable amount paid monthly to help eligible families with the cost of raising children under 18 years of age" while also cutting benefits for families at the highest income levels. It combined the "Universal Child Care Benefit (UCCB), the Canada Child Tax Benefit, the National Child Benefit Supplement, and the Family Tax Cut [also known as income splitting]" (Kesselman, 2019) along with the Children's Fitness Tax Credit and Children's Arts Tax Credit, to create this new program (McGregor, 2016). The Liberal Party of Canada, in their 2015 election platform, stated that families with children that have an annual income below $150,000, or as they also put it, 90 percent of Canadian families, would receive more monthly child benefits than under the Conservatives still in power (2015). The CCB was initially planned to be indexed to inflation with the base value staying the same by 2020, but was done so two years ahead of schedule (Lim, 2019a; Employment and Social Development Canada, 2019). Finally, a further increase was promised in the 2019 Liberal Party platform, where parents with children less than a year old would receive a 15 percent boost in their CCB payments (Liberal Party of Canada, 2019).

In what follows, I will provide a succinct background on the Canada Child Benefit, its implementation, and developments since its inception, both achieved and planned. I will then explain how this program, in relation to the previous Universal Canada Child Care Benefit, reflects a more liberal preference for welfare programs in terms of its selectivity, but that the system otherwise is not very useful in its classifications, and thus this classification of liberal does not matter very much. Afterward, I will launch into a discussion of how the Canada Child Benefit has been shown to better protect citizens from the forces of the market than before. This will show that, despite becoming more liberal and less akin to universal programs in social democratic welfare states, it is actually more effective at aiding those impacted by inequality. However, the program is not perfect, and I will briefly write about some suggested changes to further increase the effectiveness of the program. Finally, I will go into the forces that shaped the implementation of the Canada Child Benefit: mainly, the Liberal Party of Canada's progressive, left-of-centre platform that it embraced in order to win the 2015 election, and the paradigm shift

in terms of cash transfers to families over government-managed programs. This paper utilizes government statistics, newspaper articles and editorials, academic papers, and a non-government organization pamphlet in order to reach its conclusions and justify them. I will draw on Esping-Andersen's (1985) landmark paper about the different types of distributional regimes for classification purposes of the discussed programs.

Of social democracy, conservatism, and liberalism—Esping-Andersen's (1985) three categorizations of welfare states—Canada has generally fallen into the liberal category. However, the UCCB was given to every single family with children, no matter their income. This has a hallmark of universalism,[1] where all citizens believe that they are "in the same boat" (Esping-Andersen, 1985, 229), which is closer to the social democratic system than the liberal system. However, in shuttering this program to create the CCB,[2] child benefits in Canada took a more liberal turn, particularly because of its "targeted means testing" (Esping-Andersen, 1985, 233). It is a turn toward equality of opportunity by giving disadvantaged families a leg up versus equality of reward, where each family is given the same amount by virtue of simply being a family. Indeed, this sort of "poor relief" is very rare in social democratic countries, such as those in Scandinavia, but prominent in countries with a weak left wing, such as the United States and Canada. However, while the classification system works when selectivity is considered, the other hallmarks Esping-Andersen lists do not fit quite as well with this situation.

Alongside the selectivity of means testing, Esping-Andersen refers to residualism, an emphasis on private market provision, and a self-sufficient individualism as characteristics of the liberal welfare state, in contrast to social democratic or conservative welfare states. This is where complications begin to appear in our analysis. In regards to residualism, both programs were residual. The UCCB initially provided $1200 per year for each child under the age of six (Lebihan and Takongmo, 2018), while the CCB initially provided up to $6400 annually in the same situation (Liberal Party, 2015).[3] Residualism is supposed to be a sign of liberalism, and not of the more universalist social democratic policies. But for both of these policies, it is nowhere near enough to sustain a family. It is meant as an aid to make life more affordable for families, but it is inherently residual. Families are expected to be working hard to the best of their abilities to provide a good life for themselves and their children, and the government in both cases is simply lending a helping hand. If anything, the Liberal platform is less residual than the Conservative policy for almost all families, despite being more selective, which Esping-Andersen considers a characteristic of liberal welfare systems.

The emphasis on private market provision is not particularly relevant in regards to these child benefit programs. The programs are wholly administered by the government, without any involvement by private corporations to fill some gap or provide part of the assistance. This characteristic is more relevant for issues like health insurance in different kinds of welfare states, where either the state, private companies, or both can provide health coverage to citizens. Finally, the importance of self-sufficiency relates back to the idea of residualism. These payments are meant as a supplement to income generally, as families are generally expected to be employed and provide their own income to raise their families.[4] This applies, again, to both the liberal child benefits program and the universal, or social democratic, type of child benefits program. In fact, as with the analysis of residualism, one can conclude that the universal program (even with the selective programs of the time added) actually has more of an emphasis on self-

sufficiency. Those who could really use the child benefits have to provide more on their own, while those who already have enough resources to raise their children do not particularly benefit from these payments (Moffatt, 2015), which has a more or less moot impact on their self-sufficiency.

Thus, the transition to the CCB from the UCCB and its related selective programs is, at least in terms of selectivity, a definite turn to liberalism in regards to welfare program strategy. But otherwise, both the universal program and the liberal program have the hallmarks of liberal welfare programs that Esping-Andersen elucidates, and that in fact the universal program has more of these characteristics. This goes against the trends Esping-Andersen saw and reported on. I thus conclude that his classification system is of limited use, at least in this particular instance of analyzing the CCB, its implementation, and its effectiveness in shielding citizens from market forces. From here on, I will focus on the actual effects of the CCB and less on tying its design to Esping-Andersen's classification system. From that, I will judge if it is more or less effective than the previous child benefit programs.

Something to note is that an argument could be made that the UCCB and the CCB are both liberal programs, as they are both selective in that they benefit families with children while ignoring families without children. Liberal welfare systems are often needs based, and thus families with children are determined to have higher need by virtue of the expenses of having to raise children. Indeed, the issue has come up occasionally in public discourse, and a focus on child benefits arguably hurts people who fall outside of that group. There is a link between poverty and living alone, and people living alone are disproportionately affected by poverty and income inequality (Lim, 2019b). However, if universality is taken to its logical conclusion, it wades into the territory of a universal basic income. This is beyond the scope of this paper, which seeks to focus on the Canada Child Benefit and its effects and selectivity solely on families with children, and is thus not covered in any section of this essay.

Among recent literature and government reports, there seems to be a consensus about the effectiveness of the CCB. For example, Brown and Tarasuk's (2019) study of food insecurity found that overall food security was improved in Canadian households for children at all income levels, but more significantly, severe food insecurity has had a pronounced drop in lower-income families. It stated that these benefits would continue if the benefits are indexed to inflation, which they are. Minister of Families, Children and Social Development Jean-Yves Duclos stated that over 820,000 Canadians have been lifted out of poverty during the Liberal mandate, which includes over 275,000 children, largely due to the effects of the CCB (Duclos, 2019). Child poverty has sunk to its lowest level since 2002, the earliest time where comparable data are available (Argitis, 2019); child poverty went from 11 percent in 2016 to nine percent in 2017. Furthermore, the poverty rate for single-parent families has been decreasing for the last five years, and this has been associated with the more generous child benefits (Statistics Canada, 2019).

Validation has come in from other sources as well. In Manitoba between 2015 and 2017, general poverty fell from 12 percent to 8.7 percent, while child poverty fell from 16.4 percent to 9.5 percent, once again largely attributed to the positive effects of the newly established CCB (Pursaga, 2019). In addition, not only have thousands of children been raised out of poverty, but 588,000 children were kept out of poverty thanks to the assistance of the CCB (Monsebraaten,

2019). It can be difficult even for opposition parties to not attribute this fall in child poverty to the CCB plan (Coyne, 2019). University of British Columbia economist Kevin Milligan said that the CCB "played a big role" in this reduction of child poverty (Thomson, 2019a). Even Campaign 2000, a non-government organization dedicated to realizing the House of Commons' 1989 pledge to eradicate child poverty by the year 2000, has classified the CCB as part of "positive changes in Canada's social policy landscape in 2015" (2018, 6).

Indeed, Lebihan and Takongmo's (2018) study shows that "universal benefits are not effective in improving family well-being" (416). Income assistance tends to help those on the lower end of the income scale. Their study found the UCCB to not be very effective in improving families' health and behaviours in aggregate, but did find a slight positive effect for low-education families and for girls. The universality of the UCCB means that this large amount of funding for child benefits programs is not distributed in the most efficient way. Families that are worse off would see higher returns from child benefit payments, but rather than focusing on this most effective distribution of resources, universal programs like the UCCB do not test means as liberal programs like the current CCB do. Moffat (2015) refers to the UCCB as "a failure on both efficiency and equity grounds." This money is simply more valuable and more life-changing to disadvantaged families.

It must be emphasized how important this extra income can be to lower-income families. This is extra money each and every month that can be used to "pay down debt, save for post-secondary education and buy daily necessities for their kids" (Department of Finance Canada, 2019). If there's a job loss or decrease in hours or income, the CCB is a constant in family income. Market-related risks can be cushioned with this benefit. Not only does the CCB act as a constant income, but it provides more leeway for responsible financial planning. Families that live paycheque to paycheque simply cannot spare money to put into savings. This is not because they are poor financial planners or bad parents, but that there are priorities that have to come before savings, like feeding everybody, paying rent, dealing with debt, and so on. This presents a more accessible path to financial security so when the next market-related unlucky event strikes the family, they will be more likely to have something to support themselves on and to retain their dignity. Thus, this turn to a more liberal child benefits program helps the families that stand to benefit most from it because they are getting more under the CCB than they would have under the previous child benefit programs.

However, while the CCB can be seen to be an improvement over the UCCB and its related programs, it is important to note that is far from perfect. Child poverty and general poverty may have gone down in general, but there are still thousands of families who are trapped in it. Interestingly enough, most ideas to further reduce poverty with the CCB call for a further liberalization; that is, it should be even more means tested so as to give a higher proportion of its funding to lower-income families and less to those who are better off. Kesselman (2019) points out how a family with two young children and a total income of $180,000 still receives $1,696 a year. This family would not fall under the category of lower-income families that stand most to benefit from additional income. Indeed, the benefit for them equals out to less than one percent of their regular income. Kesselman also proposes several cost-neutral methods of redistributing the already allotted money to the CCB to further assist lower-income families, including providing more discretion to provinces to achieve their own distinct poverty reduction targets.

Brown and Tarasuk's (2019) food security study also points out that, while the CCB has shown positive effects on food security, it is unlikely for the gains to extend beyond the current ones with the program structured as it is at the time of writing. "[E]xisting benefit levels" are called "insufficient" to fully prevent "material deprivation" (6). Campaign 2000, while it praises the efforts of the Liberal government, stressed that all parties must seek to "build on recent momentum" (2018, 6). So, while the liberal turn of the CCB is attributed by most to have lowered the poverty rate in Canada, many argue that further liberalism is the next logical step to continue this decrease in poverty rates.

However, there is a case to be made for the incremental liberalization conducted by the Liberals. Esping-Andersen's (1985) aforementioned "universalism" describes the situation where citizens would say, as the popular song from *High School Musical* goes, "we're all in this together." That feeling of solidarity makes sure that everyone appreciates the child benefits, even if studies show that higher-income families have little, if any, perceptible gain from the benefits. There is a psychological aspect to this universalism; it is a feeling of membership that I, too, benefit from this program. If one has a perceived stake in a program, then one is more likely to defend it, or at the very least, not support its repeal. This is the case for health care in Canada; it is one of the few universal welfare programs in the country, and enjoys cross-party support because its universalism is embedded in the Canadian consciousness.

Kesselman (2019) discusses the promise of the Liberals to increase child benefit payments for 90 percent of Canadian families, and how that may tie their hands politically in retargeting CCB funds and "exclude many upper-middle-income families" (311). I argue that the Liberals have to play a very delicate balancing game. Esping-Andersen (1985) points out how leftist alliances with the middle class inhibit attempts at aggressive income redistribution. This seems to be the exact case with the Liberals: a party that got elected in 2015 and 2019 on promises of being for the middle class, defined broadly (Liberal Party, 2015 and 2019). Even if studies conclusively show the beneficial effects toward lower-income families' financial security of further selectivity and means testing for the CCB, the Liberals must always keep in mind public backlash. The further a program strays from universalism and the more it ventures toward liberalism, the less people will have a stake in it, and thus, the less politically tenable such an income redistribution becomes. By and large, lower-income families tend to not have very much political clout compared to wealthier middle-class families. The incremental liberalization of the CCB may indicate a shrewd calculus by the Liberal Party of Canada: make the CCB selective and immensely help low-income families in Canada, but only insofar as the program remains "universal" enough to enjoy broad support and give the Liberals a decent shot at getting re-elected, so that this welfare program may become more institutionalized and harder to change (Esping-Andersen, 1985). After all, lower-income families benefit more from this current amount of liberalization of child benefits than from the previous system of child benefits. This serves not necessarily as a justification of the Liberal administration's shortcomings in further pursuing child poverty eradication, but as a possible realpolitik explanation for the choices it has made regarding the CCB.

I submit that the forces that shaped the Liberal government's proposal and implementation of the CCB can be grouped into two main categories: its rebranding as a positive progressive party in the 2015 election that was left of even the NDP, and the paradigm shift

toward cash payments over government-run programs. The 2015 election campaign saw the Liberals branding themselves as the party of change after nearly a decade of interrupted Conservative government. It professed "positive politics," proposed deficits to stimulate the economy, and also proposed its Canada Child Benefit to help the middle class (Standish, 2015; Liberal Party, 2015). The NDP, on the other hand, experienced a lurch toward the centre under leader Thomas Mulcair, and emphasized its plans for balanced budgets (Standish, 2015). Part of this positive, progressive campaign involved taking concrete steps to fight child poverty, a historical goal in Canada. Starting with NDP leader Ed Broadbent's first parliamentary motion in 1989 to eradicate child poverty in Canada by the year 2000 (Oved, 2014), and followed by subsequent similar motions in the House of Commons in 2009 and 2015 (Campaign 2000, 2018), this has always been a popular goal, at least to verbally commit to. The Liberal Party built on this historical societal desire to eliminate child poverty and developed the Canada Child Benefit, as Campaign 2000 and the Caledon Institute had been calling for such a program for awhile to fight child poverty (Jackson, 2015). The party wove this initiative into its positive, progressive message, stole the NDP's momentum as both the progressive party and as the anti-Harper party (Standish, 2015), and won a comfortable majority in the House of Commons in 2015.

The other force that helped shape this program, beyond the positive and progressive rebranding of the Liberals, was the paradigm shift toward cash payments. In the 2006 election, one of the Liberal proposals under leader Paul Martin was a national, government-administered daycare program after some 20 years of consideration. Stephen Harper, then leader of the Conservative Party, instead proposed the UCCB, opting to give money to parents rather than a program. Paul Martin's director of communications, Scott Reid, claimed that people should not be given "25 bucks a day to blow on beer and popcorn. Give them childcare spaces that work." (Thomson, 2019b). The Liberal campaign caught flak from all parties, and although it cannot be concluded that this was a decisive factor in the Liberal loss in 2006, it forever changed the policy debate (ibid.). Indeed, the 2015 Liberal campaign saw it following the Conservatives in their initial idea of transfer payments rather than approaching the idea of a government-run daycare program again (Lim, 2019a). It was an understanding that voters preferred cash to government programs, or that it was at least a more electable position to take. Gordon (2015) mentions that the CCB is based on economists' understanding of the "benefits of direct transfers to low-income households." Ken Boessenkool and Sean Speer, former Harper policy advisors, called Martin's daycare plan a "grand scheme that represented the worst technocratic impulses of modern liberalism" (Thomson, 2019b). While this is definitely colourful language, it seems to be a statement that the brains behind the Liberal Party have agreed with. Child benefit programs like the CCB are effective ways of helping low-income households, and they are electable positions to take for a party.

The Canada Child Benefit, introduced by the Trudeau government in 2016 and raised twice to match inflation since then, and with a proposed increase for infants, has been a turn toward liberalism due to its selectivity and means testing compared to the previous UCCB. However, Esping-Andersen's (1985) classification system is only somewhat applicable to this situation. The other hallmarks of liberalism, those being private market solution, residualism, and an emphasis on self-sufficiency are problematic. Private market solutions are not involved in any government-administered child benefits. Residualism and an emphasis on self-sufficiency are

present in both the liberal and universal child care benefit, but arguably more in the latter, in contrast to Esping-Andersen's predictions. The CCB has largely been seen as successful in reducing child poverty and protecting families from market-related risks compared to child benefit payments under the previous Harper government. However, recommendations for further eradication of child poverty have often advocated for further selectivity, and thus, a greater turn to liberalism and away from universalism. I posit that the Liberal Party is constrained by the lack of political tenability of selective programs that are not perceived to benefit those with political clout. Finally, in their goal of gaining power in the House of Commons, the Liberal Party advocated for the CCB to complement its positive, progressive platform, and to no longer swim against the trend of cash payments over technocratic government programs. As the program continues to develop and more statistics come out, this will warrant further study as to the effectiveness of the CCB: whether further liberalization is still desirable, or even politically tenable, and whether it will become more institutionalized as a welfare program, as Esping-Andersen (1985) describes and thus, harder to remove.

Notes

[1] "Universal" is used as a proxy to refer to "social democratic" in this paper.
[2] While other aforementioned programs were also merged into the CCB, these were already selective, and thus, liberal, while the UCCB was not.
[3] As mentioned earlier, there were other selective programs that existed alongside the UCCB, but this is strictly a comparative analysis between a more "universal" program and a more "liberal" program. But even if all the Harper-era benefits were brought in, the maximum the family could get is $5,825 (Liberal Party, 2015).
[4] There are disability benefits available from the government as well, but this is tangential and beyond the scope of this paper.

Scarborough: *Articulating the Racialized Landscape in Asian Canadian Literature*
John Fidel Klarke Smith

I

Scarborough is the debut novel by Filipinx-Torontonian playwright Catherine Hernandez, published in the spring of 2017. Scarborough is a multi-racial suburb within the City of Toronto that is often overlooked by a dominant white, mainstream arts and culture industry that exists in the downtown core. *Scarborough* is a contemporary portrayal of the racialized landscape, co-created by interviews with community members (Wijekoon, 2018). The narrative interweaves threads of stories primarily from the lives three of children: Bing, Sylvie, and Laura. The children's stories are woven around and converge upon a teacher and social worker named Ms. Hina. Ms. Hina is a unique feature in the aide economy that exists within the racialized landscape because of her willingness to extend the capacity and efficacy of her responsibilities in ways that are subversive to the bureaucratic body that funds and oversees her work. At the same time, Ms. Hina also empowers the responsiveness to the needs of the community she bears witness to. It is through Ms. Hina that the reader is able to contextualize the struggles and victories of poor racialized people.

Scarborough depicts the compounded marginalizations at the intersections of race and class through the lived experiences of its characters. I argue that, like other fictional works that are explored in academics, *Scarborough* demystifies the racialized landscape by offering itself both as a window to the construction of racialization and as admissible testimony into a canon of Asian Canadian literature that expands how we understand "Canadianness." I will draw upon the works of *Obasan* (1981) by Joy Kogawa and *Lady in the Red Dress* (2010) by David Yee to demonstrate the recurrence of themes present not only in Asian Canadian literature, but in the span of realities and temporal contexts that these works speak to. One thematic pattern is that racialized landscapes are created through material deprivation, where an individual and systemic level deprivation is maintained by the de-contextualization of experiences and silencing of embodied knowledge. Additionally, by confronting state bureaucracy in ways that reclaim subjectivity and embodied knowledge, racialized communities become empowered and are reconciled within the "Canadian" landscape.

II

Hernandez uses her characters' interactions with authorities to illustrate their disempowered social position through material deprivation. Marie is an Indigenous mother with an ailing husband and is the main support of her family, living in the Galloway Shelter. Her family occupies a place of transience, somewhere you're not meant to stay, for those who come from and are trying to transcend spaces of abuse, abandonment, and drug use (Hernandez, 141). In attempting to obtain a diagnosis for her autistic son, her precarious housing situation is used against her (Hernandez, 23). She pleads with the doctor, sharing that her son's "school doesn't have time or money" to support her son adequately (Hernandez, 23). Her daughter Sylvie has an

acute understanding that accessing health aid in school risks her becoming "a ward of the state" through visibility and contact with the Children's Aid Society (Hernandez, 25). These instances suggest that when resources are available, they are withheld, risky, and potentially detrimental to well-being, or generally futile in their efficacy.

Various incidents in *Scarborough* demonstrate the alienating and disinterested nature of social supports, contributing to the racialized landscape as a trap. Pamphlets advertising community resources are in English, a language the immigrant community has difficulty accessing (Hernandez, 30). Resource brokers are not interested in building relationships with their target communities, but instead are interested in statistical reporting that justifies their aid programming to bureaucratic superiors (Hernandez, 30). This is the case even for those who are able to access grants, as with young Black artist Victor, who is profiled by police for vandalism and abandoned by the granting body that "employed his talents to revitalize the bridge. Because of his arrest, it became impossible for him to land a job to support his schooling" (Hernandez, 75). Hernandez thus demonstrates that social support does not effectively contribute to individual or community flourishment.

Obasan and *Lady in the Red Dress* offer historical examples of how racialized landscapes were constructed through deliberate deprivation. Kay Anderson contends that mainstream print media and local governments constructed Chinatown as a degenerate space (Anderson, 1987). David Yee's *Lady in the Red Dress* depicts how deprivation is created by policies enacted to deliberately keep Chinese families apart and maintain communities unsettled and impoverished through the Head Tax and Exclusion Act (Yee, 32). Civil society organized associations like the Asiatic Exclusion League for the sole purpose of excluding Chinese people from unionized work and other forms of social support (Yee, 56). *Obasan* depicts how Japanese Canadians had their rights systematically revoked, lost access to employment, and had their property and possessions confiscated. They were forced to relocate to overcrowded concentration camps where decrepit conditions were taken as evidence of Japanese savagery (Kogawa, 87). Under the federal segregation programme, even resettled communities were rendered transient (Kogawa, 154). The destruction of community is written as analogous to the destruction of life, where fractured and separated families are permanently destroyed (Hernandez, 163, 166). This general trend is summarized powerfully by *Scarborough* character Bing, a queer Filipinx child, who describes "we, the brown kids" as born into broken and reconfigured families, "we who call our grandmothers mom; we who touch our father's hands through plexiglass" (Hernandez, 114).

III

Scarborough explores how structural oppression ascribes itself on the individual and manifests through instances of inter-personal violence. Cory, a self identified "white trash" racist, is afflicted by the same lack of resources and adequate care that affects the communities of colour around him (Hernandez, 47, 85). Hernandez, however, uses Cory to explore horizontal class violence that Fanon would suggest arises from structural oppression and projects itself through racism as an outlet (Fanon, 1961). Generational trauma is passed onto his daughter, Laura, who interacts with others in Ms. Hina's classroom. Sensing Laura's needs through her hygiene and literacy level, Ms. Hina offers additional support through food and attention (Hernandez, 129). Seeing this affection, Cory rejects Ms. Hina's care, feeling hateful resentment for his

powerlessness compared with her (Hernandez, 49). Ms. Hina experiences this racist hostility as dismemberment, "being cut open… dissected… and being sewn up, with something missing inside" (Hernandez, 135).

Ms. Hina's supervisor, Jane Fulton, is an agent enacting silence through decontextualization, thus maintaining the impoverishment of racialized spaces. Jane Fulton disregards the accounts of personal struggle of the children and their families provided by Ms. Hina, requesting on multiple occasions for statistics on attendance and discouraging the reading centre as a source of food and nutrition (Hernandez, 54, 98). Her messaging cited these personalized accounts as markers of visibility that Ms. Hina should not engage in (Hernandez, 97). Jane Fulton is thus actively silencing the advocacy for and experience of racialized people.

Similar to Jane Fulton, Hatch and Max in *Lady in the Red Dress* enact silence through decontextualization. The written victim account of Tommy Jade is discounted and sneered at by government agents as supporting evidence for the injustice of the Head Tax and Exclusion Acts (Yee, 29). Their perception of reparation-seeking Chinese is at worst that of beggars who are even "worse than poor people" and at best that they are ungrateful beneficiaries of colonial capitalism who owe taxes to their country, regardless of their suffering (Yee, 23, 89). It is their imperative to quickly appease the redress movement in order to prevent legacies of racial discrimination from entering collective memory (Yee, 24).

Obasan depicts the ways Canada's dispersal policy sought to make the Japanese Canadian community disappear and never become visible again (Kogawa, 164, 31). Displaced people were misrepresented and whitewashed in newspapers as happy, industrious, and indispensable workers to the local economy (Kogawa, 173). Letters petitioning government officials were met with indifferent responses, ending up in boxes in Naomi's home. Analogous to Max in *Lady and the Red Dress*, *Obasan*'s protagonist and narrator Naomi regards using "suffering as weapons or as badges" with disdain, and prefers to move on (Kogawa, 31). For Naomi, memories of systemic racism are accompanied by feelings of physical pain and dismemberment, a characteristic that connects Naomi with Hernandez' protagonist Ms. Hina (Kogawa, 174).

IV

Hernandez uses Ms. Hina as a medium through which community experiences are advocated for against the state. Through meaningful care and relationship building, Ms. Hina restores the subjectivity of her clients. Relationship-focused reporting and accessing resources to effectively fund a breakfast program are ways she does this through her role as social worker. As her relationships strengthen, Ms. Hina takes more unconventional, subversive actions like providing personalized advice and funding to Sylvie's mom for her son's first assessment as well as self-advocacy through political engagement (Hernandez, 232). Finally, Ms. Hina directly confronts state bureaucracy through recourse to her union for support (Hernandez, 193).

Aunt Emily plays a similar role in *Obasan*. She "[toils] to tell the lives of the Nisei in Canada" (Kogawa, 37). If white Canadian society conspired to construct and produce the demonized "dirty Jap," Aunt Emily's work of collecting evidence, writing letters, engaging in litigation processes, and connecting with academics is its antithesis, and embodies the theme of voice and remembrance. Her work of entering injustices into the Canadian archive, for Aunt

Emily, is meant to initiate a process of reconciliation that "can't begin without mutual recognition of facts" (Kogawa, 163).

Sylvia in *Lady in the Red Dress* adopts Aunt Emily's strategy for reconciliation to effectively transform Max into an ally for state recognition of racial injustice. Sylvia forces Max to investigate Tommy Jade as a case study in how unjust state policies violently etch themselves onto individual bodies. Max's worldview is destabilized and he subsequently comes to accommodate this firsthand account to feel genuine remorse. Max's colleague Hatch acknowledges the implications of this individual-level listening at a societal level. "The louder and longer these people scream… the more likely that people are going to listen," and when such accounts reach a critical mass of people, the ability of the state to dismiss pleas for reparations diminishes (Yee, 24). Therefore, as a corollary, collective power and agency rest in widespread acknowledgement of inconvenient memories.

The climax of the novels draws on the intelligibility and empowerment of voice and embodied knowledge as being central to reconciliation and transformation. Jane Fulton is replaced by a racialized ally within the state structure who is both immediately validating and allows for Ms. Hina to take more strident measures in supporting the families of her students. With adequate support, Marie successfully accesses programs that enable her understanding of her autistic child's "own special language" (Hernandez, 234). Paralleling this scene is the climax of *Lady in the Red Dress*, where Max, now prioritizing the voice and experience of Chinese Canadians, is able to understand his mixed-race autistic child (Yee, 93). In *Obasan*, the silencing of truths protected Naomi until a time when she was ready to receive them, in a similar act of healing and reconciliation with the past (Kogawa, 1981).

V

Scarborough, alongside *Obasan* and *Lady in the Red Dress*, are admissible testimonies into a canon on Asian Canadian work, which simultaneously explores the construction of racialization and expands how we understand "Canadianness." These stories share experiences of racialized landscapes constructed through material deprivation aided by either deliberately discriminatory policies like that of dispersal, immigration taxation, or poorly structured social systems. The characters in these stories confront a state bureaucracy that seeks to silence them, hiding Asian Canadians away like "a stench in the nostrils of the people of Canada" (Kogawa, 102). Yet, through admission of our stories into the Canadian archive to reclaim subjectivity and embodied knowledge, it is possible for racialized communities to be empowered, thus reconciling themselves within the "Canadian" landscape.

Catherine Hernandez' *Scarborough* is an exposé of the contemporary racialized landscape that skillfully weaves together the stories of a community, converging them upon teacher and front-line social worker Ms. Hina. She is similar to the characters Aunt Naomi in *Obasan* and Sylvia in *Lady in the Red Dress*, centring the voices of their communities and contextualizing their experiences within Canadian history and contemporary life that dominant white society would prefer us to forget.

Global Leaders? A Comparison of Modern Swedish and Canadian Refugee Policies
Alexandra Thatcher

Since the 1980s, Canada and Sweden have been seen as Western leaders in refugee protection and resettlement by the international community. Their policies of multiculturalism make them desirable destinations for refugees. However, since 9/11, Swedish and Canadian immigration policies have largely diverged. Canada, after this date, has increasingly securitized its borders and attempted to curb or discourage the flow of refugees into its territory. In contrast, Sweden, despite small changes to refugee policy, has remained remarkably open until late 2015. Through a comparison of Swedish and Canadian refugee statistics and policies prior to 2016, it will become apparent that, while Canada has attempted to deter spontaneous refugees and ignore or thwart its international humanitarian obligations, Sweden has overall increased its generosity and encouraged refugees by attempting to keep barriers for asylum seekers minimal.

Turning to statistical measurements, the first focus is refugee intake. Canada, with a population of 35,848,600, has just over four refugees per 1000 inhabitants.[1] In comparison, in 2015, Sweden, with a population of 9,798,871,[2] was tied with Malta in taking in 17 refugees per 1000 inhabitants and being the highest recipient of refugees per capita outside of Africa and the Middle East.[3] While Sweden had a four percent increase in refugee acceptance in 2015,[4] Canada's refugee acceptance dropped from 23,286 in 2014 to 20,045.[5] This is in line with declining refugee resettlement rates that in 2005 had been considerably higher at 35,775.[6] Overall, these numbers demonstrate Canada's nominal commitment to refugee protection when compared to Swedish relative openness.

Although these statistics are an eye-opening indication of refugee trends, they fail to give a complete picture in that they don't address the reality of the differing geographic location of the two countries. Where Canada is largely isolated and separated by an ocean from countries that output the largest number of asylum seekers, Sweden is accessible to the European continent by road through a series of bridges that connect Sweden to Denmark, as well as several ferry routes from Germany and Denmark. This is relevant due to the large number of asylum seekers who pass through Turkey or cross the Mediterranean Sea coming from the African Continent, the Middle East, and other parts of the Asian Continent. Additionally, there are two ways of entering Sweden as a refugee: either as a quota or a spontaneous refugee. The Swedish government accepted 1900 quota refugees annually from 2011 to 2015.[7] The majority of Swedish refugee claimants are what is known as spontaneous refugees.[8] These are asylum seekers who arrive in Sweden with the goal of being accepted as refugees. Geography is made further relevant by the membership of Sweden in the European Union (EU). The EU for the most part has weak or non-existent border control policies within the continental part of the Union, making Sweden relatively accessible to asylum seekers. However, while some members of the EU, such as Hungary, erected a fence in an attempt to keep out migrants, Sweden held off from implementing border control policies until 2016. Sweden's unwillingness to do so demonstrates their commitment to rights and humane treatment of refugees.

It is important to note, however, that the Swedish government does, at times, limit its openness to refugees. As a member of the European Union and a signatory of the Dublin III Regulation, Sweden can request that individuals who have previously applied for refugee status in a different member country be sent back to that country. Though this policy seems similar to the Safe Third Country Agreement between Canada and the United States, it is different in that, unlike Canada, Sweden cannot refuse a refugee application of an asylum seeker for merely traveling through another country to reach its borders. Nevertheless, 2012 saw Sweden file 8000 outgoing requests to member nations for refugee transfers compared to just over 3000 incoming requests.[9] Despite seeming rather large, this difference must be looked at in light of the favourable policies and attitudes towards refugees compared to other countries. The draws for migrants include Sweden's policy of multiculturalism, which has been in place since 1975.[10] Furthermore, until 2016 Sweden was a country in which family reunification was comparatively easy and affordable as refugees did not need to be financially capable of supporting family members.[11] This is in line with the country's immigration guidelines, which have been in place since 1984 and which stress "that a generous refugee and family reunification policy ought to be independent [from], overall aims."[12] Despite the transfer policy, the European Court of Human Rights has on several occasions prohibited the transfer of asylum seekers to member states that could not, or refused to, grant adequate protection. Moreover, Sweden has only used this removal mechanism in a small percentage of cases. This has meant that, even with these removal requests, in 2015 Sweden granted entrance to almost 163,000 asylum seekers.[13] Although only 44,590 of these asylum seekers' applications were processed that year, 72 percent or 34,470 individuals were granted protection.[14] This refusal to return refugees to European countries where their rights may be abused demonstrates that Swedish openness is well balanced with its commitment to the international obligation of non-refoulement and the protection of refugee rights.

In contrast, Canada has thwarted its international obligations as signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the Convention Against Torture by allowing policies that directly or indirectly deny asylum seekers their right to protection, humane treatment, and non-refoulement.[15] The Canadian acceptance rate of refugee applications from January to June of 2015 was only 56 percent.[16] Despite this being a large increase from 2013 when the rate was only 38 percent, the acceptance rate remains comparatively low.[17] It must be acknowledged that Canada receives some refugee claims from nationalities that Sweden sees little of, such as China and Colombia. However, the citizenship of Canada's refugee claimants and the isolated location of Canada cannot alone account for Sweden's superior generosity as Canada has actively been trying to limit the number of refugees who are approved.

An important policy to look at while examining the value and morality of both systems is the 2004 Canada-United States Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA).[18] This agreement, with few exceptions, prevents asylum seekers who are in the United States from crossing a land border and filing refugee claims in Canada, or from Canada into the US.[19] This is different from the EU's regulation, which allows for transfer of a refugee only if they previously applied for status in another member country and their rights will not be violated. From 1995 to 2001, between 8000 and 13,000 asylum seekers entered Canada from the United States annually, but only approximately 200 left Canada for the United States.[20] In a 2010 report, the Canadian

Border Service Agency confirmed that "[w]hile the primary focus for the United States was security, Canada sought to limit the significant irregular northbound movement of people from the United States who wished to access the Canadian refugee determination system."[21] Canada continues to refuse and return these refugee claimants to the United States despite the Federal Court of Canada ruling that the American government was not meeting its international obligation to protect refugees and thus Canada could be seen as aiding in their risk of refoulement through deportation.[22] However, the Federal Court of Appeal ruled that the STCA was nevertheless constitutional, allowing the practice to continue. The Government continues to reject hundreds of refugee claims annually using this law.

The STCA must also be looked at as a deterrence tactic. Several years prior to the STCA's implementation, between 8000 and 14,000 refugee claims were made at the Canadian-American border, with 8904 being lodged in 2004.[23] In 2005, just after the Agreement came into force, refugee claimants dropped over 50 percent to 4041 and in 2011, the number dropped as low as 2563.[24] Efrat Arbel therefore rightly notes that, "since its implementation, the STCA has proven effective in reducing refugee eligibility to enter Canada."[25] Moreover, Audrey Macklin is correct in saying that the STCA "Allows Canada to do indirectly what it cannot do directly, namely, deny refugees the rights to which they are entitled according to international and domestic law."[26] To this end, the STCA is simply one way in which Canada demonstrates its lack of openness to spontaneous refugee claimants compared with Sweden, as well as its disregard for international humanitarian law. Where Canada has tightened eligibility criteria to deter and deny access for refugees to Canada, Swedish policies have minimized the barriers for refugee settlement by maintaining an open border policy and allowing a high acceptance rate.

Finally, when comparing the immigration policies of the two countries, the Canadian Government can be seen as less welcoming and failing in its obligation to treat refugees humanely. In the 1990s, relatively few refugee claimants were detained. In contrast, after 9/11, the budget for immigration detention increased, with approximately 45 percent of immigration detention made up of refugee claimants.[27] In total, approximately five to ten percent[28] of asylum seekers are detained by the Canadian Border Service Agency, of which eight percent are minors.[29] Detainees are held for 28 days on average, but Canadian law allows for the indefinite detention of immigration detainees.[30] This is despite approximately 95 percent of these detainees being neither suspect of criminality nor a security threat.[31]

In 2012, the Canadian Government gave the Minister of Public Safety the ability to designate anyone over 15 years old who arrives in a group of two or more as "irregular arrivals" and to subsequently require their mandatory detention.[32] This law was used on Romani people from Hungary who the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Jason Kenney at the time referred to as 'bogus' refugees, noting also that refugee acceptance rates were too high.[33] This is despite international law insisting that "conditions of detention for migrants have regularly been found by international courts and human rights bodies to violate the right to be free from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment."[34] Although laws such as these are presented as deterrents to human smuggling, these laws are more likely an attempt to skirt Canadian international obligations.[35]

In contrast, Swedish immigration detention better balances their international obligations to protect refugees from inhuman treatment with their need to administrate refugee claims and

maintain security. In Sweden, 3524 immigrants were detained in 2015.[36] An immigrant may be detained if their identity cannot be established or if there are reasonable grounds to suspect they will flee or take part in criminal activity. Despite its broadness, Sweden rarely detains asylum seekers, and refugee claimants make up on average only four percent of in-person immigration detention.[37] Additionally, the average length of detention was only five days in 2013 for all migrants.[38] Unlike in Canada, detainees also have access to a fair and robust review and appeal system. Even with 85 children detained in 2013, and with this number likely increasing in 2015 due to the growth in the number of asylum seekers, the amount of time Sweden held minors in detention is likely around the 2008 average of 1.6 days.[39] This is in spite of the Swedish government allowing detention of minors for 72 hours and, in very exceptional circumstances, a total of 6 days, at which point minors are required to be released and "may never be transferred to a correctional institution, remand centre or police arrest facility."[40] When compared to Canada, Sweden's brief detention periods and minimal use of detention has put it closer in line with international human rights standards for refugees, which see arbitrary detention of refugees as "inhuman"[41] and to be avoided.[42] To this end, Sweden did not before 2016 attempt to use immigration detention as a deterrent to limit the number of refugees crossing its borders, thus demonstrating its greater generosity than its Canadian counterpart.

Overall, the Swedish approach to refugees up until at least 2016 has demonstrated its superiority to Canada's through its openness and great regard for its international obligations for refugee protection. This is seen in the country's open border policy, which allowed for 163,000 asylum seekers in 2015 alone. Swedish protection of refugees is also present in its careful review of asylum cases, its sparing use of transfers and deportations, and finally its prudent detention policies. In contrast, Canada has attempted at all turns to minimize its protection of refugees, especially since 9/11, taking in comparatively small numbers per capita, and attempting to deter refugees and limit refugee acceptance rates through the use of the STCA and detention policies.

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From Knitting Needles to Megaphones: Assessing the Impact of Women's Anti-War Activism on Canadian Policy During the Vietnam War Era
Sydney Wilson

Introduction
In the United States, the Vietnam War functioned as a lightning rod for expressions of condemnation for American military actions and imperialism around the world. This resulted in an anti-war movement of unprecedented size and impact on national and global perception of the war and the United States. Accordingly, US anti-Vietnam activities have been a central aspect of historical scholarship on the war from the beginning. From this, a general consensus has emerged regarding the impact of public protest on American Vietnam War policy (Powell, 2010).[1] In Canada, however, with few exceptions, the anti-war movement has largely been lumped into more general discussions of the 1960s. Analysis of its effect on government policy, meanwhile, did not occur until the 2000s with the publishing of such works as Robert Bothwell's *Alliance and Illusion* (2007) and Stephen Azzi's *Reconcilable Differences* (2015).[2] Consequently, no such general conclusion on the policy impact of dissidents has yet been reached.

The major thematic exception to this generalizing of 1960s movements has been the experience and impact that US draft dodgers and other war resistors had on the Canadian conception of the Vietnam War, which has, relative to other anti-war aspects, been extensively explored. However, women, who represented over 50 percent of US immigration to Canada in protest of the Vietnam War, have been almost totally neglected by historians, and there remain only a handful of scholarly works that address their experiences and contributions to Canadian anti-war and anti-draft activities (Campbell, 2009, 339-340). Interestingly however, and in contrast to US anti-war scholarship, which has focused heavily on student protests, the only Canadian anti-war organization about which substantial scholarship has been written is Voice of Women (VOW), the first women's peace organization in Canada (Powell, 2010, 71). Overall, while Canada's anti-Vietnam historiography has been overlooked as a whole, women's contributions to it have simultaneously been relatively widely documented in some capacities, and mostly ignored in others.

This essay explores the effect of women's anti-war activities on Canadian governmental policy during the latter half of the 1960s and into the beginning of the 1970s. This timeframe was chosen to focus most directly on the years when women's activism, as well as general activism towards the war, was most prevalent and impactful. In keeping with available scholarship, the essay focuses heavily on VOW and VOW-affiliated women's activities while attempting to make use of as much of the more recent scholarship on broader women's anti-war endeavors as possible.[3] In doing so, the argument will be made that the successes and downfalls of women's activism, far from merely being an extension of men's anti-war activism, were intrinsically linked with the conceptions of gender and gender roles prevalent at the time. Specifically, women were effective at getting public support for and changing the hearts and minds of those who were previously neutral. Their actions often also resulted in clarifications or articulations of

government policy. However, with a few exceptions, this failed to translate into the government making substantive policy change. This essay will explore why this was the case through an analysis of Canada's role and policies in Vietnam, how gender functioned as both an asset and a liability for women activists, and finally, an examination of the connections between the anti-war movement and the women's rights movement.

Canadian Involvement in Vietnam
Canadian involvement in the Vietnam War was a complicated affair deeply connected to the wider histories and politics of the Indochinese region. It began first when Canada was selected for the International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC), the international governing body created at an international conference in Geneva in 1954 in order to oversee the three ceasefire agreements made for Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam (Bothwell, 2007, 196-198).[4] The ICSC was created in an attempt to put a halt to the conflicts between the Vietnamese nationalist movement led by communist Ho Chi Minh and the former colonial governing body of France. In light of that goal, it was composed of three delegations: one country within the Communist bloc, one country within the Western bloc, and one theoretically neutral country to ensure 'fairness' and act as the tiebreaking vote (Bothwell, 2007, 197).[5] Their selection came as a surprise to Canada, which had not even stayed in Geneva past its discussion of the Korean War on account of its desire not to be involved in Indochinese affairs (Bothwell, 2015, 258-62).[6] However, Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson agreed to be on the Commission, sensing that to refuse would be detrimental to the country's international standing, especially with respect to its vastly more powerful southern neighbour, the United States (Bothwell, 2015, 197).[7]

Throughout the early 1960s, involvement from both Communist and Western powers escalated. As all-out war became an eminent certainty, Pearson clung firmly to the position that, as a member of the ICSC, it was necessary for Canada to officially stay out of the war and remain neutral, albeit with an understood pro-democracy stance (Eayrs, 1983, 276-77).[8] Accordingly, Canadian officials were firm, both privately and publicly, that they would not contribute troops after US president Lyndon B. Johnson established a military ground presence in 1965. Beyond its participation in the ICSC, the Canadian Government had no formal policy on Vietnam. It did, however, conduct a relatively significant sale of arms and other military items to the US during the 1960s and early 1970s through the US-Canada Defense Production Sharing Agreement (English, 1992, 146). Canada also funded Vietnamese aid programs, which focused primarily on medical aid targeted solely to South Vietnam (Culhane, 1972, 95-96). As such, Canadian actions around Vietnam consisted of three somewhat contradictory components that the government tried to present in isolation from each other in order to maintain a public policy of neutrality.[9]

In keeping with the trends discussed in the previous historiographical analysis, early scholarship on Canada and the Vietnam War focused largely on these international and governmental considerations. Specifically, works from the 1980s and early 1990s predominantly examined Vietnam's function in establishing a general model for Canadian international relations, as well as the economic and political reasons behind the Canadian Vietnam policy. Scholars such as James Eayrs argue that Vietnam was fundamental to the development of Canada's position as a middle power whose international strength was in finding compromise

and negotiation (Eayrs, 1983, 282-284). More critical works, such as that of Victor Levant, argue that Canada's growing economic dependency on trade with the US, as well as the substantial rise in gross national product (GNP) as a result of selling war materials, led the government to adopt an overall policy of complicity and collusion with US goals. This occurred, according to Levant, through actions such as partisan ICSC dealings and an overemphasis on quiet diplomacy (Levant, 1983, 4-9, 61-62). When public opinion was discussed, it was argued that what actually signified was the opinion of an educated minority of upper-society individuals whose voices spoke close to the ears of power (Bothwell, 2007, 282; English, 144). Virtually none of these works so much as references any kind of women's activism or VOW itself, despite the fact that it was one of the most influential women's activist organizations in the world and was on many occasions granted audiences with top Canadian and international officials.[10]

Women's Anti-War Activism: Femininity as an Asset
In the mid-1960s, as tensions escalated rather than diminished and Western involvement in Vietnam dragged past the decade mark with no end in sight, awareness and disapproval of the Vietnam War grew within Canada. Historian Robert Bothwell argues that the timing of anti-Vietnam activities occurred in large part because the energies of the "anti-establishment minority" prone to public protests were absorbed in the Ban-the-Bomb movement during the 1950s and early 1960s, and that only after the failure of that campaign was energy re-directed into anti-war activism (Bothwell, 2007, 218). VOW originated prior to the war as an awareness and lobbying campaign about the imminent dangers of nuclear war. As such, it was in keeping with the larger anti-war activist trends of the time.

Women were involved in all aspects of anti-war protests, including draft-dodger work, student movements, and women-specific organizations (Campbell, 2009, 341-42). In general, campaigns that stayed within the confines of accepted women's behaviour were received well by the public, media, and government. The VOW knitting project, the organization's largest and most successful campaign, provides an excellent example of this. Started in 1965, the objective was to engage women in the act of knitting hats and other items of clothing for Vietnamese children. All materials had to be made in dark colours so as to camouflage the children from falling US bombs (Early, 2008, 31-33). Vietnamese organizations engaged in war aid had previously stated that medical supplies and money were the most effective donations, so this project was less about providing the most direct benefit to the Vietnamese and more specifically about raising awareness of the horrors of the war. Director of the project Sheila Young spoke of the campaign's impact in a letter to VOW president Kay Macpherson, stating, "we have found that actual involvement in 'making things' has done more to arouse compassion and publicize the great need for acts of humanitarianism, and the desperate need to halt the war, than any other project" (Early, 2008, 31). By 1969, the project had over 2000 knitters across both Canada and the United States. Notably, as the war went on, women came from increasingly varied and non-activist backgrounds, including the Silver Cross Mothers of Canada, an organization of mothers who had lost their sons in war, and various public schools, which meant that there was some endorsement and approval of the project by state institutions (Early, 2008, 35). While it is impossible to tell the specific impacts of this particular initiative on Canadian policy, its growth over the late 1960s, especially among people who had previously identified as neutral on the

issue and for whom this was their first anti-war activity, suggests it had a notable effect on growing public disapproval. As such, it is a reasonable conclusion that VOW's project contributed both to pressure on the Canadian Government to resist further US requests for assistance and to make albeit somewhat limited policy changes, such as official acceptance of deserters.

In addition, activities like the knitting project produced an emotionally evocative narrative that cast the members' efforts in a maternal feminist model. This made it difficult for the government, media, or war supporters, to criticize without appearing heartless or as though they were attacking mother-like women, a protected societal class (Early, 2008, 35). As such, women's activism that fit into pre-existing gender roles had the potential to be successful in ways other anti-war protestors' activities, such as student protests, did not.

This phenomenon was not only utilized by women. On May 13, 1967, senior cabinet minister Walter Gordon used his speech at the Sixth Annual Arts and Management Conference of Professional Women to express that he was "sick at heart at what is going on" in Vietnam and that he feared that, without policy change, the US might "be driven to use nuclear bombs or to spread germs or exterminating chemicals" (Gordon, 1977, 363-69). This is significant for several reasons. First, the explicit connection to nuclear concerns parallels much of the rhetoric espoused by anti-war activists, including VOW. Thus, his speech suggests that activists were in fact having an effect on the minds and decisions of top government officials. Second, Gordon's words caused an immediate reaction in government, with a formal policy declaration being brought forth in cabinet just four days later. The declaration directly rebuked Gordon by stating that "no single country bore sole responsibility and, to concentrate condemnation and criticism on the United States, and to make public pronouncements to that effect, was wrong and unnecessary" (LAC, 1967).

A few months afterwards, however, Minister of External Affairs Paul Martin asked Gordon to accompany him to a NATO foreign ministers' meeting where Martin urged the United States to stop its bombing campaign in North Vietnam. As such, Gordon's speech had an undeniable effect in causing Canada to become more critical of US policy, something that he asserts within his own memoir.[11] Finally, the fact that he chose to make these remarks at a women-specific event, using deliberately emotionally charged language, cements the argument that femininity, and the subsequent expected concern with humanity's well-being, could be an asset that provided space for otherwise unacceptable expressions of distaste for the war, ultimately resulting in tangible policy change.

Women's Anti-War Activism: Femininity as a Constraint
Conversely, activities that fell outside of accepted expressions of femininity were treated harshly by the public, media, and government. In 1964, VOW leaders Thérèse Casgrain and Kay Macpherson were arrested while attempting to deliver a letter to the Secretary General of NATO in opposition to the multilateral nuclear force. Despite their status as leaders of a significant movement that had an influential track record within the anti-nuclear sphere, their actions, which amounted to an assertion of the validity and weight of their opinion, caused substantial backlash.[12] The difference between public reception to this, in comparison with VOW's knitting

campaign, makes clear that women's activism would only be tolerated when it did not challenge gendered spheres of activity and male-exclusive power structures.[13]

The refusal to recognize the expertise and status of women activists was not an isolated incident. Claire Culhane, a prominent VOW leader and staunch anti-war advocate who became one of the movement's most recognizable figures due to her highly public protests, was frequently derided by the media and elected officials.[14] Her efforts focused primarily on the problems she saw with the Canadian medical aid programs. This included the fact that they were being used as CIA data-gathering sites, were so poorly equipped and managed as to make them borderline useless, and only provided medical assistance to South Vietnam, claiming to be solely a civilian humanitarian effort. Her work drew almost entirely on her first-hand experience working as a hospital administrator at a Canadian hospital in the Vietnamese coastal province of Quang Ngai from October 1967 to February 1968. She ultimately resigned from this post due to her moral objections over the administration of the entire program (Culhane, 1972, 35, 92, 114). As such, Culhane's very public protests fell outside the feminine realm due to her claim of expert status and her focus on addressing the government's culpability, rather than the emotional programs such as the VOW knitting project, which was void of explicit policy critique. Accordingly, despite having spent time on the ground, and having returned and immediately written a 16-page report detailing her experience and the problems she encountered, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), which was the government organization in charge of medical aid, denounced her claims to be an expert. The head of the ICSC delegation, Gordon Longmuir, meanwhile described her on multiple occasions using negative and specifically gendered terms, such as "highly emotional and erratic," "naïve," "confused," and "insatiable" (Brookfield, 2015, 196). Even NDP leader and public anti-war supporter Tommy Douglas belittled Culhane's efforts. After her removal from the House of Commons gallery during her planned protest demanding that Minister of External Affairs Mitchell Sharp comment on Canada's complicity in the Vietnam War, Douglas commented that he was used to being interrupted by women because he had "been married for a long time" (Canada, 1971).

Meanwhile, Dr. Alje Vennema, who had also worked in the hospital in Quang Ngai, and who also returned to become an anti-war activist espousing much the same views on Canadian medical aid as Culhane, received an entirely different reception. Rather than disparagement of his knowledge or character, he was referred to in the House of Commons as "a man of unquestionable integrity." He was also, just months after his return from Vietnam and the start of his activism, awarded the Order of Canada in 1967 (Canada, 1972). It is likely that honouring him with the Order of Canada was seen as a way of appeasing rapidly growing public outrage and creating the impression of government action. However, the decision to award it to Vennema over Culhane, as well as the general differences in their treatment, illustrate that while public dissent did have an effect on government action, it was listened to and valued on a hierarchy of privilege that fundamentally favoured men.[15] The fact that Culhane was eventually given the Order of Canada in 1995 removes any question that her work was less important or impactful than Vennema's, merely less recognized at the time.[16]

Despite the highly negative and gendered treatment she received from the government, Culhane's activism was far from futile.[17] Her ten-day fast, which occurred between September 20 and October 9, 1968, resulted in many members of government publicly disclosing their

opinions, which ultimately allowed anti-war activists of all kinds to more effectively campaign. On her last day of fasting, she was given a meeting with Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, who expressed admiration for her convictions but refused to engage in political discussion on Canada's Vietnam policies before suddenly being reminded by his secretary of a dinner engagement and cutting the meeting short (Brookfield, 2015, 194-195). Culhane's experiences are indicative of a trend within Canadian women's anti-Vietnam activism where women often worked on the same issue concurrently or before men did, but it was not until significant male activism occurred that their goals were achieved.

This fact is also illustrated by an earlier incident around issues of border crossing and immigration. Immigration from the US in protest of the war, most often as a result of draft dodging, formed a large part of Canadian consciousness about the war from 1965 onwards. Government policies on immigration, specifically their frequent refusal of military deserters at the border and their secret collaborations with the FBI to track and detain draft dodgers, became one of the most important aspects of the anti-war movement in Canada (Campbell, 2009, 345). In 1965, the Winnipeg chapter of VOW invited Mulford Sibley, a Quaker and pacifist, to speak at a meeting. Sibley was refused entry by immigration officials under Class 5(m) and 1 of the Immigration Act, which barred "subversives" from entering Canada. After protestations from various groups, Minister of Immigration Jack Nicholson was sent to investigate, and admitted that "there is a genuine conflict between the rights of Canadians to listen to what ideas they choose and the rights and procedures regarding immigration as defined by the statute" (Levant, 208). Nicholson invoked ministerial discretion to allow Sibley's entry, and Pearson sent him a letter of regret over the incident (Anon, 1965). This incident, initiated by VOW, is one of the first cases where the government admitted that there was an issue over the way Immigration was handling supposed draft dodgers, political dissidents, and deserters. However, it was not until 1969, after five Canadian male students were denied entry into Canada at five different border points while impersonating the same US deserter, William John Heintzelman, that the government announced an official policy change to clarify that desertion was not an acceptable reason to be denied entry (Levant, 1986, 208). As such, women were once again an important factor in the development of anti-war initiatives, but their actions failed to reach the level of long-term effect on policy, while male action on the same issue did.[18]

Women's Anti-War Activism: Connection to the Women's Movement
In attempting to analyze the women's anti-war movement in Canada, it is wholly necessary to look at its connections to and tensions with the wider women's equality movement that was emerging in Canada and elsewhere during the 1960s. Women did not function simply as an extension of men's anti-war activism. Often, they brought a specific feminist perspective, chanting slogans such as "child care not warfare" and explicitly drawing connections between US and Western imperialism overseas and women's oppression at home (Campbell, 341). This represented an important development in feminist consciousness. However, the 1971 Vancouver Indochinese Conference illustrates how this intersectionality often resulted in disagreement and preoccupation over whether activism should be targeted towards ending the war, ending colonization, or ending women's oppression.[19] Division occurred on a less theoretical and more practical basis as well. In 1970, for example, Canadian abortion activists felt torn between

protesting the Kent State shooting and participating in the months-planned Abortion Caravan to Ottawa. As Judy Pocock, a Canadian feminist activist, put it, "our hearts, for many of us, were in Toronto [with the Kent State shooting protests] because that was such a big deal. And for many of us that was all part of the same thing" (personal interview, cited in Stettner, 2013, 439). Thus, while many women perceived the linkages between multiple issues, they presented both philosophical and logistical problems regarding allocation of time and resources. As a result, their divided work pulled women in multiple directions and muddied the clarity of their demands, thus making their voice less effective in changing Canadian Vietnam War policy in an era that was decades before the idea of intersectional politics and activism entered public consciousness.

In addition, VOW fell increasingly out of favour with women activists as the women's movement developed through the late 1960s and early 1970s. As was demonstrated by repeated accusations at the 1971 conference, women, particularly younger women, felt VOW was ultimately too centrist and concerned with being associated with 'radicalism' (Campbell, 341-343). These fractures contributed to the division of resource problem discussed in the previous paragraph by leading more and more women to choose to devote their attention to other organizations. As a result, fewer women became involved in the anti-war movement, which damaged its strength and significance, and ultimately its ability to influence the government. Considering how restricted public tolerance and favourability of women's activism was, however, VOW can hardly be blamed for wanting to disassociate itself as much as possible from any hint of radicalism. This was not only out of concern for their public standing. As the resignation of VOW members over the arrests of Casgrain and Macpherson demonstrates, reactions to activities that strayed outside the accepted femininity model could be equally as intense from within their own organization.[20] While this likely proves the accusation of centrism to be correct, it also demonstrates that VOW leadership was in a difficult position, where embracing many more progressive aspects of the women's movement likely meant outrage and resignation from much of its own base. As such, the connection of VOW, by far the greatest aspect of the women's anti-Vietnam War movement, to the larger women's movement was ultimately a hindrance to their ability to achieve their own goals of swaying Canadian government policy in a more anti-war direction.

Conclusion

This essay has attempted to demonstrate the ways that women's anti-war activism was specifically affected by their status as individual women, participation in women-specific groups, and their association with the larger women's movement. Analysis of the VOW knitting project and Minister Gordon's speech at the Professional Women's Conference demonstrate the considerable successes that were possible when traditional ideas of femininity were harnessed as a tool, thereby allowing for emotional connections between the war in Vietnam and individuals at home. However, the fact that one of the most cogent examples of this occurred as a result of Minister Gordon's actions illustrates that, even when directly within the feminine realm, male actions were almost invariably taken with more gravity, and consequently led to greater change, than female action. This devaluing of women's action is further demonstrated by the backlash

against Thérèse Casgrain and Kay Macpherson, as well as the government's reception of Claire Culhane's activism in comparison with that of Alje Vennema.

Despite this, in both gender-role conforming and non-conforming actions, women were quite successful in gaining public attention. As the VOW knitting project, invitation of Quaker Pacific speaker Mulford Sibley, and Culhane's work demonstrate, their actions often resulted in increased pressure on the government, which helped result in some policy clarifications, such as the regulations on accepting deserters as immigrants. They also had substantial effect on forcing politicians to make public statements detailing their position on various issues relating to Vietnam, including Canada's medical aid and sale of war materials to the United States. However, despite their best efforts, significant change eluded them. The Pearson government stayed largely silent after President Johnson's intense reaction to Pearson's 1965 Temple University speech, where he suggested that the US halt bombings (Bothwell, 2007, 227). One would have expected that women's anti-war work would have more success once Pierre Trudeau was elected as prime minister in 1968 on account of his more critical assessment of Canada's foreign policy engagement. In keeping with this, Trudeau purported himself to be spearheading a series of major changes to government systems in light of a widespread feeling of alienation from government decision making, especially regarding foreign and defense policy (Azzi, 188). Yet, David Ritchie, ambassador first to the United States and then to Britain during the Vietnam War period, noted in his diary that "…he [Trudeau] is not really a revolutionary. Is this process aimed at the reversal of alliance or at real economic and social programs of change? No." He went on to characterize Trudeau's actions as "a grandiose and perhaps necessary manoeuvre" to establish trust and communication with the people. Even more telling, Ritchie then admitted that the foreign affairs establishment was cognizant of the superficial nature of Trudeau's reforms, and was fully on board with them because the department functioned on the whole as an "organized lobby against change" (Ritchie, 1983, 127). Considering this, it is hardly surprising that the women's anti-war movement was not able to generate substantial change.

Furthermore, this problem was not unique to women's anti-war activism, but was true of all segments of the movement. If the women had failed, then so had the men who were also facing far fewer hindrances resulting from gendered hierarchy or entanglement with other 1960s rights movements. As such, the Canadian women's anti-Vietnam War movement should be recognized and commended for the successes they did achieve, however limited they might have been.

Notes

[1] For further analysis, see Sale (1973), Halstead (1978), Zaroulis and Sullivan (1984), and Small (2002).
[2] One notable exception is *In the Interests of Peace: Canadian Foreign Policy and the Vietnam Truce* by Douglas A Ross. Stemming from his PhD thesis of the same title, Ross attributes the increasingly critical nature of Canadian policy during the later 1960s to growing public protest (Ross, 1984, 12-14). However, despite stating that it was an important factor, Ross does not delve further into what, or who, public protest consisted of.

[3] There exists a quite substantial archive of VOW materials in the Library and Archives of Canada. Unfortunately, for this essay, travel to Ottawa to access these fonds was unfeasible. As such, VOW material stems from more widely available newspaper articles, published memoirs of prominent VOW members, and materials from the VOW archives cited within published secondary scholarship.

[4] The politics of the Indochina region, made up of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, were a convoluted mix of colonial legacy, World War II power shifts, and Cold War tensions. It was an important French colony, but after France's fall to Germany during World War II, there was significant internal unrest as the Japanese overthrew the French regime, and then a nationalist uprising, led by communist Ho Chi Minh, declared independence for Vietnam. France proceeded to re-establish control, leading to the breakout of the First Indochina War between French and Viet Minh forces in 1946. The war extended out of Vietnam into both Cambodia and Laos as part of a larger anti-colonial pro-communist movement. In 1950, Communist China formally recognized and began sending aid to Viet Minh. By 1954, the prospect of France's total defeat seemed likely, but the Americans, alongside the rest of the Western World, were reticent to get involved and escalate yet another Cold War theatre, and with it, heighten the possibility of nuclear war. An international conference in Geneva, whose main purpose was to discuss the Korean War, proved a suitable opportunity to take stock of the international community's mood.

[5] The communist representative became Poland, and the neutral chair position went to India. The US actually preferred Belgium as the Western representative, likely because it was a French-speaking country. However, both the Indians and the Chinese felt a former colonial power, especially a Francophone one, was too close to having France itself on the commission. Canada, on the other hand, had never been a colonial power in this way, nor did it have significant interests in the region. For further discussion of the selection of Canada, especially relating to Canadian-Indian relations, see Chapter 7, "'Poldel,' 'Indel,' 'Candel'" (Eayrs, 1983).

[6] On the whole, Pearson and the Canadian Government felt that Western involvement in Indochina was a mistake and thought that, even if South Vietnam fell to the communists, that was a preferable cost to what he correctly worried would be a long-lasting, costly, and ultimately nebulous and mostly futile engagement.

[7] This sense of obligation was actively cultivated by, in this instance, the British and, in later policy, the US, with full awareness of Canada's less powerful position and the importance that Britain, and then increasingly the US, had to its economy and defense. As a result, Pearson's reasoning here was indicative of how much of Canada's Vietnam War policy as a whole would be decided.

[8] During the same time period, Canada was actively considering pulling out of the ICSC due to a sense of frustration and wasted resources, owing to the Commission's lack of substantive action. However, it was ultimately decided it would be better to stay, in large part because of the shield it provided against requests for further involvement in the war.

[9] In addition to the criticisms they drew from activists, these supposed distinctions were not always clear, or comfortable, for those in government either. For example, during a cabinet meeting in 1966, the Minster of Forestry inquired as to whether there were plans to begin sending medical assistance to North Vietnam as well as South Vietnam, which in his view would be in keeping with their role on the ICSC. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs,

responded that medical aid was part of the External Aid Program and "quite unrelated to Canada's role on the Supervisory Truce Commission" (LAC, 1966).

[10] VOW was the inspiration for the founding of women's activist organizations in England, Scotland, and New Zealand, with the Canadian organization's name used as homage to the impact and level of organization VOW possessed. Women Strike for Peace, the somewhat equivalent American women's activist organization and arguably the most influential of the time, was actually started two years after VOW (Early, 2008, 26).

[11] Gordon also received over a thousand letters of support, and several favourable editorials were published demonstrating both the reach and resonance of his message with the public. Sharp's speech to NATO also represents a move away from the mostly silent stance of the Canadian Government on Vietnam in the wake of President Johnson's deeply negative reaction to Pearson's speech at Temple University in 1965, where he suggested the US halt bombings (Gordon, 1977, 282-84).

[12] This included the resignation of several VOW members themselves, mainly from Ontario, who felt that this kind of behaviour was "unseemly" for the VOW president and top leadership. In Quebec, however, Casgrain was extremely well received by VOW members (Early, 2008, 26).

[13] While largely outside the scope of this paper, this suggests an interesting and potentially contradictory dynamic with the women's movement as a whole, whereby in order to get results on anti-Vietnam activities, women activists were forced to conform to, and thus reinforce, the very gender roles the women's movement was seeking to alter. A greater analysis of the positive and negative effects of the intrinsic connections between the women's anti-war movement and the feminist movement is discussed later in the paper.

[14] Culhane's actions included, for example, a ten-day hunger strike on Parliament Hill, which earned her the nickname "fasting granny" (Brookfield, 2015, 188).

[15] It is important to note, although beyond the scope of this paper, that this hierarchy was also deeply raced and classed, and that both the anti-war movement and the women's movement in Canada during the 1960s were overwhelmingly composed of white middle-class people and women. As Christopher Powell indicates in *Vietnam: It's Our Movement Too*, little Canadian-specific literature on these subjects exists, in keeping with a broader dearth of scholarship on Canadian Vietnam protest (Powell, 2010, 40, 45). For a discussion of US working-class involvement, see Foner (1989). For analysis of the interconnections between race and anti-war activities in the US, see Hall (2005).

[16] It is worth remarking that recognition of women is not a by-gone problem. There remains, for example, no Wikipedia page on Claire Culhane.

[17] According to Culhane's memoir, in February 1969, Patrick Watson, then co-host of CBC "Sunday," wanted to feature Culhane's story. Upon cancelling the night prior to taping, Watson began his explanatory note to Culhane with "I'm at a loss to understand the hostility to you," having evidently received considerable pressure to drop her story.

[18] Of course, it must be noted that much had changed between 1965 and 1969, including increased public anti-war action in the US and a switch in government from a minority Liberal government under Pearson to a majority Liberal government under Trudeau in 1968. However, it could be argued that, with a majority government, Trudeau faced significantly less pressure to enact change than Pearson had. Further discussion of Trudeau's views on foreign policy and the

arguably superficial actions he took as a result of public disenchantment with the government are discussed in the conclusion. In any case, when analyzed as part of a larger pattern of recognition of men's activism over similar women's actions, this immigration case is worth noting.

[19] The conference was organized by VOW in conjunction with Women Strike for Peace, and consisted of women-activists from across Canada, the United States, and a delegation of women from both North and South Vietnam.

[20] Of specific unease and indignation to VOW members was the possibility that Casgrain and Macpherson had consorted with "left wing militants" while in jail (Macpherson, 1987, 68).

On Disease and Democracy: Cholera in Nineteenth-Century Canada
Adam Wynne

In Toronto, access to indoor plumbing, water, and waste management systems was divided along class and social lines until 1877, with major developments in water and waste management systems not being undertaken until the 1880s. The role that this class and social division of housing utilities had on disease transmission dynamics and subsequently the development of democratic and societal institutions and public policy in Canada cannot be ignored. The City of Toronto[1] and the Canadas were hit by a series of epidemics spanning from the early to the mid-nineteenth century. Particularly notable were a series of three cholera outbreaks that fuelled significant public fear of future outbreaks. In "Social Investment in Medical Forms" (2000), Bruce Curtis calls this popular ideological phenomenon "cholera culture." Each of these major outbreaks preceded and likely prompted the emergence or development of vital democratic and societal institutions in the Canadas. Disease is a tool of control and subjugation because it limits the availability of the labour force, as well as an element that fuels regional self-determination, self-governance, and autonomy. In the early and mid-nineteenth century, public health was marred with moral environmentalism and moral absolutism, contributing to public discourse and public distrust of governmental regulatory bodies. Furthermore, ill-planned waterway remediation projects and overly complicated municipal processes at the time impaired infectious disease vector elimination and thus infectious disease management and treatment.

Cholera, a waterborne bacterial illness, often fatal, was a significant force in colonial Canada. Most immigrants arrived by sea. As early as the 1840s, colonial Canadian officials noted a link between port of origin and increased risk of 'zymotic' (infectious) disease[2] on board maritime vessels (Curtis, 2000, 363). Outbreaks of highly contagious diseases were particularly problematic in ports along the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence River during the 1830s and 1840s. The early colonial government was "prepared to abrogate individual liberties of property, privacy, and movement while specifying regulations for the conduct of individuals in relation to themselves and others" (Curtis, 2000, 369) in order to address these inter-regional outbreaks of infectious disease.

The early Canadian industrial cities along the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence must be thought of as an interconnected series of municipalities due to their historic reliance on waterway access for transportation of goods, people, and trading services. Easily traversed road systems were not yet common infrastructure outside municipalities in the early to mid-nineteenth century. Quarantine checkpoints were established at several points on the Gaspé Peninsula and at Gross Île just east of Québec City. Maritime vessels were ordered to anchor and fire a cannon to announce their presence to officials, though oftentimes vessels would sail right past, claiming ignorance of the laws (Curtis, 2000, 365). The quarantine checkpoint system created some of the earliest forms of statistical medical data in Canada by recording port of origin, number of passengers, classes and quantities of goods, and presence of fever (Curtis, 2000, 363). It is important to note that this early form of public health surveillance came before the era of rapid

communication, when the presence of cholera or other diseases at a quarantine checkpoint or notices from other colonial port cities were received and spread with public fervour.

Mail deliveries often announced the presence of cholera or other diseases linked to trade regions. At least one region—the Mississippi River trade network—went through extensive mail disinfecting programs in the nineteenth century to try and promote public health and safety while limiting the spread of disease through contaminated mail items (Ellis, 2017). Disinfecting mail items was an attempt to prevent a breakdown of social cohesion, communication, and thus functional societal operation in an era before rapid communication methods. An outbreak of cholera in Caribbean port cities often heralded an outbreak in the Americas and Canadas several months later (Curtis, 2000, 347-348).

Disease followed shipping and trade routes as well as interregional migration patterns in the early to mid-nineteenth century.[3] In "Social Investment in Medical Forms" (2000), Bruce Curtis calls public response to this disease phenomenon "cholera culture" as it involved an integrated approach with actors on all levels, from the international to the municipal, as well as from corporate to individual, so as to promote knowledge of cholera transmission and the elimination of transmission routes and vectors. In an era before water and waste management systems, eliminating cholera and diseases at the source was a vital management routine, coordinated and executed by regional authorities rather than colonial authorities across the Atlantic. It was functionally impossible for colonial authorities across the Atlantic to respond and manage outbreaks in a timely and thus effective manner. This regional authority over health of its residents fuelled early notions of Canadian self-reliance, self-governance, and autonomy.

In 1923, prominent Toronto historian Jesse Edgar Middleton (1872-1960) summarized developments in the late nineteenth century as "Toronto no longer felt itself a compact little city, but a straggling big one, outgrowing its civic as rapidly as a small boy outgrows his pantaloons" (Middleton, 1923, 337). The sanitary idea, drawing on the zymotic and subsequent contagion model of disease rather than the miasmic theory, was not introduced to Toronto until the late 1870s, despite being introduced in London in the 1840s. This transition in understanding of disease transmission dynamics had vital impacts on democratic procedures in Toronto and the Canadas. Prior to this ideological shift, at the height of the cholera outbreaks in the 1850s, the development and implementation of water and waste management systems in the city was marred by overly complicated municipal procedures. Prior to the economic and subsequent sewer boom of the 1880s, the majority of Toronto's residents' waste was either dumped in bulk into the waterways—usually the rivers, the inner harbour, or Lake Ontario—or directly into unhygienic cess and privy pits in the yards of residences. Several of these rivers were buried due to public health concerns over water quality and still flow in Victorian sewers under the downtown core of Toronto, causing structural instabilities above, since infill has settled and shifted over the buried waterways.[4]

Catherine Brace in "Public Works in the Canadian City" (1995) describes how residents had to petition the municipal authorities in order to implement sewer systems in nineteenth-century Toronto. To install a sewer, each block on the street required its own petition: "two thirds of residents had to vote on it; followed by a city study on the efficacies of it" (Brace, 1995, 34). This model became plagued by austerity measures, class distinctions, and civic in-fighting among neighbours and neighbourhoods. Such a model of democracy is fundamentally important,

though the block-by-block specific requirements hindered progress in the implementation and integration of vital, life-saving water and waste management systems. Brace (1995) further elaborated on this in-fighting as "an out of sight, out of mind attitude seem[ed] to have prevailed, producing a dichotomy between the willingness to pay for a sewer in one's own street and the unwillingness to pay increased taxes for a trunk sewer system" (Brace, 1995, 34). However, changing the common public dialogue from one of financial drawbacks on the taxpayer to that of functionality in increasing individual property values elicited a greater and more appreciative public response to the importance of implementing water and waste management systems. Namely, having "a sewer into which one's property drained increased the value of that property and removed the smelly nuisance of the privy pit in the yard" (Brace, 1995, 41) while simultaneously reducing and largely eliminating a major vector for cholera and other infectious diseases.

Stephen Bocking in "Constructing Urban Expertise" (2006) identifies the importance of technical expertise within urban planning procedures. The emergence of this notion augmented "the emerging capacity of the city to regulate and provide for itself" (Bocking, 2006, 53). Outbreaks of cholera and other infectious diseases sparked the creation of institutions and regulatory bodies in the name of governance and promoting public safety. This was closely tied to trends of 'moral environmentalism' and 'moral absolutism' where religious notions of moral and immoral behaviours impacted public policy. This model of public policy was pervasive in Canada until the late twentieth century. Trends can also be identified where cholera outbreaks precede significant developments in public and state institutions and public policy in the early Toronto and Canadian experience. Three large cholera outbreaks occurred in Toronto's history during the following years: 1832, 1849, and 1854-1855, with a significant panic but no regional outbreak in 1866.

The year 1831 saw the formation of the Gooderham and Worts Industrial District, located on the west banks of the Don River Delta. This industrial district was home to Upper Canada's grain processing centres, which rendered grain derivatives, products, and by-products. The Gooderham and Worts Industrial District expanded several times between the 1830s and 1860s, eventually housing multiple processing, distilling, and rendering plants. By-products of these plants included "refuse from a large number of cattle byres, or dairy and beef fattening yards, also being dumped into the marsh lands … [eventually] there were seven byres with a capacity for more than 4000 animals" (Desfor, 1988, 80) concurrently dumping waste into the wetland and waterway systems of Toronto. Additionally, during this era, the residential centre of Toronto was located in present-day Corktown, which resulted in significant volumes of human sewage entering the Don River and Inner Harbour waters systems, forming a significant source of biohazardous pollution.

Some of the earliest technical reports for regional authorities indicate severe concern over the state of the Don River Delta, Ashbridge's Marsh, and the Inner Harbour of Toronto, as these environments were the common dumping grounds for residential and industrial waste products. The model of First Nations and Indigenous displacement identified by Andrew Highsmith in "Demolition Means Progress" (2015, 25) in the context of industrial and manufacturing American cities also holds true for Canadian industrial cities, particularly in the context of accessing the vital environments and waterways of Ashbridge's Marsh. The year 1832

additionally saw the establishment of the first Parliament in Upper Canada, located in present-day Corktown, Toronto. Parliament was located only a few hundred metres from the Gooderham and Worts Industrial District, a significant economic industrial hub. Regional authorities had identified a public problem but had failed to identify the relationships, mechanisms, or vectors for regional disease outbreaks in relation to environmental contamination and degradation.

The year 1849 saw a significant cholera epidemic along the St. Lawrence and Great Lakes waterways. Joseph-Charles Taché (1820-1894) was a Québecois doctor and the deputy minister of agriculture, who was working in the St. Lawrence region during the 1840s. Taché extensively documented his observations on cholera transmission along ports on the St. Lawrence River. That same year, Taché published the "Memorandum on Cholera" and introduced 20 public health laws and bylaws (Curtis, 2000, 359) based on his experiences and observations managing the St. Lawrence quarantine checkpoint system in the early and mid-nineteenth century. These regulatory guidelines intersected across city planning, housing services, transportation services, medical officials, port and waterway authorities, and judiciary forces in ensuring measures were followed to limit the transmission of cholera and prevent other outbreaks. This regulatory model was initially implemented in French Montréal and Québec City and adopted in English Kingston and Toronto later the same year (Curtis, 2000, 359). However, public distrust in the newly emerging medical field impaired levels of reporting of the disease, particularly with overbearing notions of moral environmentalism and moral absolutism enacted by the regional authorities.

The year 1853 was a pivotal year in the management of Toronto's water and waste management systems. Kivas Tully (1820-1902), a city engineer, councillor, and port authority, published a report in 1853 urging immediate action to remedy the "cess pool" (Desfor, 1988, 80) created by annual natural flood events and exacerbated by significant sewage and waste dumping on the east boundary of Toronto harbour. Tully's report advocated redirecting the Don River into Ashbridge's Marsh by cutting a channel in the marsh and erecting a breakwater on its western boundary. It is important to note that during this era, the environment immediately east of the Don River Delta was one of the largest continuous urban wetland ecosystems in North America (Armstrong, 1966). Toronto has been described as a city "set in malarial lakeside swamps" (Giblett, 2018, 113), which aptly describes Ashbridge's Marsh. Ashbridge's Marsh,[5] named after the park lot estate owned by the Ashbridge family that encompassed the wetland, had been a significant source of food and resources, both for Indigenous peoples for thousands of years, as well as early colonial settlers (Giblett, 2018, 115). Giblett (2018) further asserts that "the city of Toronto had a marshy and swampy beginning that has largely been forgotten" (115). Tully saw this wetland as having potential as a retention system for sewage and waste products from both the economic industrial and residential zones of urban Toronto. His vision had grave implications. Residential sewage coupled with biohazardous waste products from thousands of cattle at the industrial rendering plants suddenly started flowing into Ashbridge's Marsh and stagnated. This resulted in the cholera outbreak of 1854-1855 that killed an estimated 5000 Torontonians,[6] many of whom are still buried in cholera pits under St. James Park, Toronto's former mass graves or public "cholera grounds" (Bilson, 1980, 36).

The year 1854 saw the emergence of infectious disease medicine in Canada through the establishment of the School of Medicine at Trinity College, now the University of Toronto, in

response to growing numbers and severity of epidemic disease outbreaks in the region. In *The Lancet* in 1854, Dr. George Gibb (1821-1876), a faculty member of the department of pathology and surgery at McGill University and the St. Lawrence School of Medicine, published "On the Successful Treatment of Cholera in Canada" to document his observances of treating cholera patients in ports along the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence. Although cholera is bacterial, Gibb advocated for the treatment of cholera with a mixture of terpene camphor and calomel (Gibb, 1854). The involvement of fungicidal calomel was a product of the Victorian notions of zymotic medicine, or the thought that illnesses fermented in the body like fungus or yeast, which was an early interpretation of infectious disease management. However, early notions of infectious disease management and treatment in the Canadas in the 1850s were plagued by misguided, though not malicious, attempts to prevent and treat infectious disease.

Of note is Gibb's contemporary Dr. James Bovell (1812-1880), a founding member of Trinity College's Faculty of Medicine, who in 1854 proposed and then put into practice the process of fresh milk intravenous transfusions to treat cholera in the general public (Roland, 1964, 812). A description of this process is provided in a biography of Dr. James Bovell, published in 1964 by Dr. Charles G. Roland (1933-2009) in the *Canadian Medical Association Journal*. This process became the topic of both medical and public debate (Roland, 1964, 812-813) on the grounds of its effectiveness and legitimacy. Interestingly, less than a decade later, Dr. Bovell was implicated in another stream of public debate and scandal over the safety of Toronto's hospitals after being responsible for the first documented patient death from anaesthetic chloroform at Toronto General Hospital in January 1863 (Roland, 1964, 813). Dr. Bovell was then later implicated in further accusations of implementing illegitimate or unfounded medical discourse after delving into 'moral absolutism;' that is, Dr. Bovell proposed governmental regulation of dress codes in public contexts and church fashion in the name of public health (Roland, 1964, 814). Needless to say, public perceptions of these assertions and proposals were not overwhelmingly favourable (Roland, 1964, 814) and impaired public willingness to voluntarily engage with the medical professionals and health systems of the time. The establishment of a school of medicine in Toronto facilitated early notions of education and institutional research and development in the name of public health and safety, as well as public sector development in response to the 1854-1855 cholera epidemic. However, it is important to remember notions of accountability and consequence when translating theory into practice. The implications wrought by misguided, illegitimate, and unfounded medical discourse and practice diminished public faith in both medical and governmental authorities during vital periods of both developmental and medical discourse in Canada.

The year 1866 was the eve of Confederation and independence in the Canadas. The year 1866 also saw American, Canadian, and Caribbean cities and ports gripped with mass fear of cholera outbreaks. An outbreak of Asiatic cholera in continental Europe in 1865 and subsequent outbreaks in the French port cities of Guadeloupe and Martinique in 1866 fueled public fears that it would spread north and inland to the Canadas based on regional maritime trade routes (Curtis, 2000, 347-348). This public fear was so strong that it resulted in the formation and approval of the Public Health Act by Thomas D'Arcy McGee (1825-1868) in 1866, which was incorporated and carried over into Canadian legislation in the post-1867 Confederation period. Of importance

is that McGee was the Canadas' minister of agriculture, which was the position responsible for enacting quarantine measures.

The following decade after Confederation saw several other favourable developments in the realm of public health and public sector development. The Public Health Act enacted measures around control, containment, and management in affairs leading to negative public health outcomes with the aim of mitigating or preventing them. A significant component of this was addressing unhygienic and unsanitary housing conditions that stemmed from the lack of water and waste management systems in residential areas and economic industrial zones. During this era, "people from all levels of society resented the work of the health wardens as they entered houses and pointed out sanitary failings" (Bilson, 1980, 35), regardless of the occupants' class or social position. Delegation of state power over the individual and property to various jurisdictional boards and regulatory bodies in the name of public health fueled public discourse into the political foundations of health care. Public concerns centred around the feasibility of only employing one chief medical officer for the entire region (Curtis, 2000, 358). This model was problematic because a single individual would be responsible for all decision making, and subsequent policy influence drafted according to personal biases and personal stakeholder interests in the relevant proceedings. Regardless, outbreak of contagious and deadly disease and subsequent containment and management of the outbreak fuelled ideologies around self-governance, self-reliance, and autonomy in the Canadas and clearly influenced the confederacy through the incorporation of pre-colonial, regionally created health models into official post-Confederation national health policy.

Medical committees attempted to allay fears of hygiene and sanitation-based bias through announcing the strategy of employing a bilingual doctor to address both English and French civic and cultural interests (Curtis, 2000, 358) in the mid to late nineteenth century. This doctor "would have ten police officers at this disposal to inspect people's yards for privies, cess pools, and stagnant water" (Curtis, 2000, 358). In 1877, the chief medical officer and health wardens were delegated the authority to approve sewer installation without city council approval (Brace, 1995, 37 & 41). It is important to note that Toronto City Council had previously held the power to approve the installation of sewers without a public petition or consultation process but often did not because of concerns that constituents would become irate over increased taxes as a result of the infrastructure projects. The 1880s saw extensive developments in Toronto's water and waste management systems coupled with strong regional market forces and industrial prosperity. The Toronto sewer boom of the 1880s resulted in thousands of homes being connected to water and waste management systems, with miles of sewers being built in a number of years,[7] compared to metres of sewers per year near the completion and final integration of the waste management system in the early 1890s (Brace, 1995, 38). In 1889, a report was issued about the specific sanitation and health problems associated with the significant environmental contamination of Ashbridge's Marsh (Brace, 1995, 40). However, large-scale waste management system installation declined in the 1890s due to an economic depression, with Mayor Robert John Fleming (1854-1925) eventually cancelling the program in 1892 (Brace, 1995, 40). The implications of installing water and waste management systems for the burgeoning City of Toronto were massive and largely eliminated epidemic diseases in the urban Toronto region by the late nineteenth century.

In 1892, a significant public health and public sector scandal unfolded in Toronto involving fiscal mismanagement and apparent fraud during proposed land transferral for alleged containment, remediation, and treatment of the contaminated industrial environments at the Don River Delta and Ashbridge's Marsh. This scandal was defined by a mysterious public entity known as the Beavis and Brown Syndicate. This syndicate proposed to municipal authorities that, in exchange for reduced property tax and an exclusive monopoly for commercial activities on the lands for 45 years, it would undertake the costs and duties of environmental remediation of Ashbridge's Marsh (Desfor, 1988, 81) in the name of public health. Despite these proposed arrangements, the syndicate repeatedly refused to reveal the identities of its financiers, board members, and employees (Desfor, 1988, 81). This elicited public and political suspicions and accusations. Bizarre financial transactions and exemption policies dotted the documents, with one report indicating the funds were accessible in London, and another a few days later claiming the syndicate did not and had never existed (Desfor, 1988, 81). Accusations arose that the board members were local aldermen and councillors who would benefit from developments along the eastern boundary of the harbour, primarily from wharf and quay development for incoming ships that would bypass navigation around poorly dredged inner harbour channels (Desfor, 1988, 81, Moir 1988, 112). This scandal fuelled public discourse and distrust of the abilities of regulatory government bodies to enact unbiased change without publicly accessible data and fiscal monitoring protocols in place. It was not until 1912 that the Keating Channel was proposed in order to remedy regional water and waste management issues (Bonnell and Fortin, 2009), created as the legacy of industrial economic and residential development almost a century before. Toronto has a complex history regarding the relationship between the management of infectious disease and stewardship of its lands and waterways. Rampant and unchecked industrial and residential activities in the early and mid-nineteenth century created a significant public health hazard through mass biohazardous contamination of the Don River, Ashbridge's Marsh, and the inner harbour of Toronto. Overly complicated colonial administrative policies in elements of public infrastructure design and implementation resulted in significant delays in vital water and waste management systems, which could have saved thousands of lives. A lack of accountability for early regulatory boards resulted in public mistrust of governing authorities, resulting in diminished interactions between the medical system and the public. Significant lessons could be learned not only in the history of Toronto as a city, but in approaches and management of future public infrastructure and land stewardship projects in post-industrial urban environments.

Notes

[1] I will be using Toronto in this context, as the name York was only used between 1793 and 1834, prior to the settlement's incorporation as a municipality.
[2] These were early colonial interpretations of infectious disease and microorganisms causing disease. Zymotic refers to notions of fermentation, in that disease would 'ferment' in the individual like fungi or brewers' yeast.
[3] French trading routes linked French-Canadian and Acadian populations with New Orleans and the Franco-Caribbean island colonies and ports.

[4] See a media example on Shaw Street near Christie Pits: https://toronto.citynews.ca/2015/04/01/adjusting-to-life-in-the-crooked-houses-on-shaw-street/

[5] The marsh overlaid present day Leslieville and the Beaches, a significant distance inland from the shores of Lake Ontario.

[6] The total population of Toronto (York) in 1854 was just over 30,000. Approximately one-sixth of the population was killed by cholera during this epidemic.

[7] No doubt, Toronto's brickworks and metal foundry industries were significant clients.

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